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I. INTRODUCTION
Trial by jury is the centerpiece of the criminal law. The possibility that
innocent people might be convicted is tolerable only because a jury has
found that a specific defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on each
element of the crime charged.' If the decision of guilt or innocence has
been taken away from the jury entirely, we say that a defendant was not
properly convicted because he did not receive a trial by jury. We are not
sufficiently convinced that the defendant is guilty.
Yet there are times when a jury is prevented from finding a defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on each element of a crime. A trial court
judge might fail to send just one element of the crime to the jury, but allow
the jury to make a determination on the remainder of the elements of the
crime. This is clearly a mistake of constitutional proportions: to satisfy due
process and the constitutional guarantee of a jury trial, the jury must decide
that every element of the crime has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt
in order for a conviction to hold. There is another side to the story,
however. Often, the missing element is so easy to establish, and so
obviously present, that on appeal a remand of the case would be a waste of
2judicial resources.
For defendants who believe they have not received a fair jury trial, the
remedy-as for all sorts of error at trial-is to appeal. But courts of appeals
cannot reverse every conviction or sentence on trivialities and technicalities.
Rather, courts of appeals apply one of two basic standards to determine
whether they should reverse: harmless error review or plain error review.
Appellate courts apply the harmless error standard when a defendant has
preserved his objection for appeal by raising it in the court below. An error
is not harmless, and the court will reverse, if the prosecution fails to
establish that the error did not harm the defendant's "substantial rights."
3
Alternatively, appellate courts apply plain error review when the defendant
did not raise an objection at trial.4 A defendant seeking reversal under the
'In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
2Indeed, some of the earliest cases in this area dealt with the failure of a trial court to ask a
jury, in federal bank robbery cases, whether the bank in question was Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) insured. Although FDIC insurance was an element of the crime (for
Commerce Clause purposes), nobody seriously doubted the bank was FDIC insured. Reversing a
conviction for error because the court failed to ask the jury if the bank was FDIC insured would
have been a reversal on a true technicality.
3FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a).
41d. 52(b).
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plain error standard bears the burden of persuading the court that not only
did the error affect his substantial rights, but that the public reputation of
the courts will be called into question if such an error is not corrected.
In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court held that sentencing
factors increasing a defendant's sentence above the statutory maximum
punishment are essential elements of the crime that must be submitted to a
jury.6 Although Apprendi was not a drug case, courts most commonly
apply the Apprendi doctrine to hold that the amount of drugs involved in a
drug crime is an essential element of that crime and must therefore be
submitted to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Given the
volume of drug crimes, Apprendi appeals are now among the most common
types of appeals before the circuit courts.
The question, on appeal, is whether the court of appeals should affirm or
remand sentences where the trial court failed to submit the element of drug
quantity to the jury. At first, most courts routinely remanded such cases for
re-sentencing, recognizing that under Apprendi, the defendant had not
received a trial on every element of the crime. However, the Supreme
Court's recent decision in United States v. Cotton now allows a court of
appeals to disregard Apprendi error and affirm the erroneous sentence if the
appeals court determines the evidence of the drug amount was
"overwhelming" and "essentially uncontroverted. '' 7  Courts are now
grappling with what those terms mean, and defendants are seeking
innovative ways to present their appeals in order to avoid application of this
stringent standard.
Under this new regime of review for Apprendi error, defendants seeking
to raise an Apprendi challenge to their post-Cotton conviction not only face
a likely unfavorable ruling on the substance of their claims, but also
substantial procedural hurdles preventing them from asserting Apprendi
claims on habeas corpus. As a result, defendants have begun devising new
and innovative techniques for presenting their Apprendi-style cases. For
example, a defendant might challenge the failure of the prosecution to
present every element of the crime charged to a grand jury for indictment,
as is required under the Fifth Amendment. When the crime proven at trial
is different from the crime charged in the indictment, courts have held that
5United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985).
6530 U.S. 466, 496 (2000).
7United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 634 (2002).
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the indictment has been "constructively amended." 8 Because some courts
continue to treat such Fifth Amendment constructive amendment of
indictment claims more favorably than a straightforward Apprendi claim,
defendants have begun to bring their Apprendi challenges as Fifth
Amendment claims.
This Article will first analyze the Supreme Court precedent on plain and
harmless error review that eventually resulted in the Cotton decision. Next,
the Article will discuss the Apprendi decision itself, the expansion of the
Apprendi doctrine to new areas of the law, and some problems that courts
have encountered in applying the rule of Apprendi in subsequent cases.
Third, the Article will explore the Cotton decision and the application of the
Cotton rule by the courts of appeals. Finally, the Article concludes with
several recommendations. First, courts should apply the Cotton
overwhelming and uncontroverted test in a common-sense manner, and
should remand cases when the evidence against that particular defendant is
not overwhelming or uncontested. Second, courts should apply the
overwhelming and uncontroverted standard differently when reviewing a
decision of a trial court for harmless error, rather than for plain error, in
light of the underlying principles of each test. Third, at the same time that
courts apply a more open reading of Cotton, they should also act to close
loopholes that some defendants are currently using to present their
Apprendi claims under cover of other doctrines.
The question of how to review Apprendi error properly has never been
more compelling. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Ring v. Arizona
placed review of Apprendi error at the heart of almost every death penalty
appeal pending in the nation, during a period of national crisis over the
accuracy and fairness of the death penalty. 9 Death row inmates can now
argue that their right to a jury trial was violated because a judge, rather than
a jury, found their crimes contained aggravating factors that merited the
imposition of the death penalty.' 0 At the same time, the Court's recent
ruling in Harris v. United States raises more questions than ever about
which sentencing factors are actually essential elements of a crime." Given
the state of flux in the law, district courts will inevitably err in their
interpretation of Apprendi. Careful review of these errors is an absolute
gUnited States v. Syme, 276 F.3d 131, 148 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Wade, 266 F.3d
574, 583 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Harrelson, 754 F.2d 1153, 1174 (5th Cir. 1985).
9536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
'
01d.
"536 U.S. 545, 549 (2002).
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necessity if courts are to prevent complete erosion of the basic right to trial
by jury.
II. REVIEW FOR ERROR
Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure sets forth the
harmless and plain error rules.' 2 This rule states:
a) Harmless Error. Any error, defect, irregularity or variance that
does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.
b) Plain Error. A plain error that affects substantial rights may be
considered even though it was not brought to the court's
attention. '
3
The doctrine of harmless error bars courts of appeals from reversing
trial convictions on technicalities that did not impact the trial or affect the
"substantial rights" of the defendant. 14 The doctrine of plain error allows
courts to notice errors causing manifest injustice even when the defendant
failed to object below. However, under the plain error doctrine, the focus
falls on the integrity of the court proceedings, rather than on the rights of
the defendant. A court will only reverse for plain error if "the error
seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings." '15  The body of law surrounding these doctrines is
complicated and conflicting. A review of the history and case law of the
harmless error and plain error doctrines will inform the discussion of the
Cotton standard as applied to Apprendi cases.
A. Harmless Error
At common law, error at trial merited reversal, leading to endless
reversals of trial decisions and waste of judicial resources as cases were
remanded for technicalities that had no impact on the overall outcome of the
case. 16 This was altered by the first federal harmless error statute, passed in
1919, the text of which was largely the same as the current Rule 52(a). 17
12FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a).
Bid.
14 Id.
'
5 Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997) (quoting United States v. Young, 470
U.S. 1, 15 (1985)).
162 STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW
§ 7.03 (3d ed. 1999).
'
71d.
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The purpose of the statute was to prevent endless retrials based on
meaningless quibbles over violations of the rules.' 8 To that end, courts
were directed to disregard errors that did not affect the substantial rights of
the defendant below. Under the modem rule, this harmless error review is
triggered only when the defendant preserves his objection for appeal by
raising it at the trial level. 19
On appeal, harmless error review follows a two-step inquiry.20 The
reviewing court first discerns whether an error occurred at trial, then asks
whether the error affected the defendant's substantial rights.2' The standard
for the substantial rights determination depends on whether the error is of
constitutional dimensions or simply consists of deviation from a statutory
rule.22 The rule for statutory harmless error is largely that set forth in Rule
52(a): if the error substantially impacted the trial, the error is reversible.23
The analysis for constitutional error is, in theory, more favorable to the
defendant. In the seminal case, Chapman v. California,24 the Supreme
Court held that constitutional error could be held harmless only if the
reviewing court believed "that it was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt., 25 The Court stated:
[A constitutional] error affects substantial rights if it was
"prejudicial," meaning that the error must have affected the
outcome of the district court proceedings. In making this
inquiry we do not become in effect a second jury to
determine whether the defendant is guilty. Rather, we must
determine whether the record contains evidence that could
rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the
omitted element.26
In sum, if a defendant raises his objection at trial, on review, he will
benefit from a more lenient standard of review. Under harmless error
review, the prosecution bears the burden of persuasion, and an error will be
8 d.
19Ramirez-Burgos v. United States, 313 F.3d 23, 28 (1st Cir. 2002).
2028 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 652.03 (3d ed. 2002).
2 1id
22CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 16, § 7.03; MOORE ET AL., supra note 20, § 652.03.
23FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a).
24386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
251d; accord CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 16, § 7.03.
26Ramirez-Burgos v. United States, 313 F.3d 23, 29 (1 st Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
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reversed unless the reviewing court finds the error harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt 27 and that the defendant's substantial rights were not
affected by the error.28
B. Plain Error
When a criminal defendant has failed to object to an error at trial, he
may nevertheless ask a reviewing court to reverse for plain error. "Under
[plain error], before an appellate court can correct an error not raised at
trial, there must be (1) 'error,' (2) that is 'plain,' and (3) that 'affects
substantial rights.' 29 "If all three conditions are met, [a court] may then
exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error
'seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the
courts' .3°
Unlike harmless error, the doctrine of plain error was first born from
precedent, then codified. The doctrine already existed in 1868 when the
Supreme Court restated the plain error principle: "[i]f a plain error was
committed in a matter so absolutely vital to defendants, we feel ourselves at
liberty to correct it."31 The rule was originally rooted in the concept that
courts possess the discretion to correct errors that would cause a wrong
result at trial; essentially, plain error was noticed when it would have
resulted in a miscarriage of justice. 32 The doctrine evolved, however, based
on the fact that a defendant could forfeit a right by failing to raise an
objection at trial. 3 Plain error review in every context, therefore, seeks to
balance these two principles: A defendant can forfeit objections by failing
to raise them below, but some errors have such a destructive effect on the
trial process that they must be corrected to maintain faith in the courts and
the justice system.34
27Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.
28Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999) (citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24); FED. R.
CRIM. P. 52(a).
29 Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997) (quoting United States v. Olano,
507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)).
3 0 d. at 467 (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985)).
3 1Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632, 658 (1896).
321d.
331d.
34id.
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Harmless error review focuses on the rights of the defendant and
whether those rights were impaired as a result of the particular trial error.
Plain error review-while incorporating harmless error review's
requirement that any error must affect the defendant's substantial rights in
order to be reversed-further focuses on the entire trial process, and
concludes that if the error does not cause doubt as to the competence or
legitimacy of the courts, it should not be reversed. The second difference is
that under harmless error review, the prosecution bears the burden of
persuasion on appeal,35 while a defendant asking the court to reverse an
unobjected-to error under the plain error standard bears the burden of
establishing prejudice and that the error will affect the fairness, integrity, or
reputation of the courts.36
C. Structural Error vs. Trial Error
The cases dealing with error are split along another axis as well. There
are a set of constitutional errors that are considered harmful per se.
3 7
Structural errors, so named because they affect the integrity of the trial
process itself, are reversible without any actual finding as to prejudice to the
defendant's substantial rights. At last count, the Supreme Court has found
that an error is structural, and therefore not subject to harmless or plain
error analysis when there has been: (1) complete denial of counsel; (2) a
biased trial judge; (3) racial discrimination in selection of a grand jury; (4)
denial of self-representation at trial; (5) denial of public trial; or (6) a
defective reasonable doubt instruction.
38
35United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993).
36Ramirez-Burgos v. United States, 313 F.3d 23, 29 (1st Cir. 2002).
371n Neder v. United States the Court summarized:
Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which governs
direct appeals from judgments of conviction in the federal system, provides
that "any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect
substantial rights shall be disregarded." Although this Rule by its terms
applies to all errors where a proper objection is made at trial, we have
recognized a limited class of fundamental constitutional errors that "defy
analysis by harmless error standards."
527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999) (citations omitted).
38Neder, 527 U.S. at 8; see generally Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993) (defective
reasonable-doubt instruction); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986) (racial discrimination in
selection of grand jury); McKaskle v. Wiggings, 465 U.S. 168 (1984) (denial of self
representation at trial); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984) (denial of public trial); Gideon v.
2003]
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Trial errors are the set of errors, most commonly raised below and on
appeal, that are best dealt with within the context of an otherwise fair trial.
An erroneous jury instruction that does not accurately reflect the law, for
example, is not deemed to be a structural error, but rather an error that may
possibly be harmless, since it might not affect the outcome of the trial
process.39 Structural error, by contrast, could never be held harmless, since
the error touches the structure of the trial and taints any outcome.
It is especially important to fit the two different dichotomies,
harmless-plain error and structural-trial error, together. When an error is
structural, prejudice to the defendant's substantial rights is presumed.
Therefore, a structural error is reversed automatically under harmless error
review and is reversed under plain error review if the structural error also
affects the reputation of judicial proceedings. However, if the error is trial
error, then the court will proceed to determine whether the substantial rights
of the defendant were in fact harmed. Thus, the determination of whether
an error is structural or trial error only settles whether the substantial rights
portion of the error analysis-common to both plain error and harmless
error review-is satisfied.
The failure to present each essential element of the crime to the jury is
especially difficult to characterize in terms of structural or trial error. A
jury is the most important structural component of a trial; certainly the total
denial of a trial by jury would constitute a structural error that would be per
se reversible on appeal. Challenges to the proper composition of the jury
are also deemed structural. 40 A directed verdict in favor of the prosecution
would, similarly, deny the defendant trial by jury altogether and, therefore,
is also structural. However there are a set of errors, comprised of erroneous
instructions or failures to instruct the jury, that hamper the jury in
performing its role, but are not necessarily treated as structural error. The
Court has engaged in a case-by-case analysis of these errors of instruction
or omission, seeking to determine whether in such cases the error can be
fairly dealt with within the context of the trial, or whether the effect of the
error on the jury was so destructive that the defendant was effectively
denied a jury trial altogether.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (complete denial of counsel); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510
(1927) (biased trial judge).
39See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 503 (1987) (holding a misstatement of an element of an
offense is subject to harmless error review).
40See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263 (1986) (racial discrimination in jury composition
is structural error).
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D. Sullivan v. Louisiana: Deficient Instructions and Structural Jury
Error
In 1993, the Supreme Court decided Sullivan v. Louisiana to settle
whether an error affecting the jury's deliberations constituted structural
error or trial error.41 The Court had previously decided Vasquez v. Hillery,
holding racial discrimination in the selection of a grand jury was per se
reversible.42 However, Vasquez turned on a right to have a properly
constituted jury, something that was rightly deemed clearly structural.43 In
contrast, Sullivan considered whether a district court's error in submitting
an erroneous jury instruction could so impact the jury's deliberations as to
essentially deprive the defendant of a jury trial. 4
Sullivan had been convicted of first-degree murder, committed in the
course of an armed robbery of a New Orleans bar.45 The trial judge
instructed the jury on reasonable doubt using an instruction that had been
previously declared unconstitutional by the Court because it could allow a
court to convict "based on a degree of proof below that required by the Due
Process Clause., 46  The government conceded that the instruction was
erroneous but argued that the error was harmless.
47
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, stated that the Sixth Amendment
guarantee of a jury trial in all criminal prosecutions "includes... as its
most important element, the right to have the jury, rather than the judge,
reach the requisite finding of 'guilty.' 48  He continued: "[C]ertain
constitutional errors, no less than other errors, may have been harmless in
41508 U.S. 275, 281 (1993).
42474 U.S. at 263-64.
431d.
"Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 281.
451Id. at 276.
46Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 41 (1990). In Cage the trial court gave an instruction on
reasonable doubt that included such phrases as "such doubt as would give rise to a grave
uncertainty" and "an actual substantial doubt," and that the jury must have a "moral certainty" in
order to acquit. Relying on In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970), Cage held that such an
instruction was unconstitutional. "It [is] clear that a reasonable juror could have interpreted the
instruction to allow a finding of guilt based on a degree of proof below that required by the Due
Process Clause." Id.
47Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 281.
48ld. at 277. The Court noted that this was the source of the inability of a judge to direct a
verdict in favor of the prosecution. Id. (citing Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 105-06
(1895)).
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terms of their effect on the fact-finding process at trial. 49 Justice Scalia
determined that the failure to instruct a jury so as to deprive it of its role in
the trial required a different result because "there has been no jury verdict
within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment." 50 "The most an appellate
court can conclude is that a jury would surely have found petitioner guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt-not that the jury's actual finding of guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt would surely not have been different absent the
constitutional error. That is not enough.,
51
E. United States v. Olano: Applying Harmless Error to Jury Error
Despite the wide-reaching nature of its logic, Sullivan was qualified one
month later by the Supreme Court's next decision considering jury error,
United States v. Olano.52 Olano applied plain error review to affirm despite
conceded jury error, and in so doing established the modem standard for
plain error review. 3
In Olano, petitioners had been convicted on multiple counts for their
participation in an illegal loan kickback scheme.54 Both parties agreed that
fourteen jurors would hear the case, but that two alternates would be
selected (and removed from deliberations) before deliberations began. 55
Since the eventual alternate jurors had listened to the trial qua jurors, the
court suggested they be allowed to observe, but not participate in, the jury
deliberations. 56 The defendant at first objected, but later relented, and the
491d. at 279 (citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986)) (quotations omitted).
5 Id. at 280.
The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a trial that occurred without
the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the
guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the
error. That must be so, because to hypothesize a guilty verdict that was
never in fact rendered-no matter how inescapable the findings to support
that verdict might be-would violate the jury-trial guarantee.
Id. at 279.
511d. at 280.
52507 U.S. 725, 741 (1993).
531d.
54Id. at 727.
55 d.
561d. at 727-28.
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court allowed the alternate jurors to attend the jury deliberations.57 During
deliberations, one of the alternate jurors was excused, but the other attended
the deliberations until the end.
58
The Olano Court determined this was both error (defined by the Court
as a deviation from an unwaived legal rule) and plain (defined by the Court
as "clear" or "obvious") then proceeded to the third step of its analysis, that
of substantial rights.59  The Court determined that an error affected
substantial rights if it "affected the outcome of the district court
proceedings. "
60
The Olano Court first acknowledged that a remedy under plain error
review was discretionary. 6' The Court then proceeded to establish a rule for
when that discretion should be exercised: "The court of appeals should
correct a plain forfeited error affecting substantial rights if the error
'seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.'' 62  The circuits have adopted the Olano framework, with
minor glosses.63
Olano set forth the now-familiar requirements for plain error review: to
recognize plain error, the defendant must show (1) that there was error at
trial; (2) the error was plain; (3) the error affected the defendant's
substantial rights; and (4) the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity,
571d.
58Id. at 729.
59Id. at 733.
6Id. at 734.
61Id. at 735.
621d. at 736 (citing United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936)).
63United States v. Godwin, 272 F.3d 659, 672-73 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Olano, 507 U.S. at
732) (citations omitted).
It was not until 1993, in United States v. Olano that the Supreme Court
clarified the limitations on appellate authority to correct forfeited error.
Under Olano, we may not address a defendant's forfeited claim unless three
requirements are met: (1) there is error, i.e., deviation from a legal rule, (2)
the error is plain, meaning clear or obvious; and (3) the error affects
substantial rights, actually changing the outcome of the trial proceedings.
Even when these three prongs of Olano are satisfied, a court of appeals
should not intervene unless "the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity
or public reputation ofludicial proceedings."
Id. (citations omitted).
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or public reputation of judicial proceedings. 64 The decision rejected the
principle that plain errors may only be remedied to prevent miscarriages of
justice, which the Court defined as the conviction of a defendant who is
actually innocent.65
The Court decided that no harm resulted from allowing the extra juror to
observe the proceedings. 66 "Respondents have made no specific showing
that the alternate jurors in this case either participated in the jury's
deliberations or 'chilled' deliberations by the regular jurors .... In sum,
respondents have not met their burden of showing prejudice under 52(b). 67
Because the Court determined that the defendant had not met the burden of
showing substantial prejudice, the majority did not apply the public
reputation portion of the test, leaving that analysis for a later date.68
F. United States v. Johnson
The Supreme Court reiterated and polished its plain error standard as
applied to jury error in United States v. Johnson.69 Johnson considered an
appeal from a conviction for perjury.70 At trial, the district court instructed
the jury that the judge would decide whether Johnson's misrepresentations
were sufficiently material to support conviction.71 Johnson was convicted
and sentenced to thirty months in prison.72 Johnson appealed,73 but before
her appeal could be heard, the Supreme Court held, in United States v.
Gaudin, that the element of materiality in a perjury charge must be
submitted to the jury.74 On appeal, Johnson claimed that the failure to
submit the element of materiality to the jury was per se reversible as
structural error.
75
6401ano, 507 U.S. at 732.
651d. at 736 ("[W]e have never held that a Rule 52(b) remedy is only warranted in cases of
actual innocence.").
661d. at 737.
671d. at 739-41.
681d. at 741.
69520 U.S. 461, 468-70 (1997).
7
°Id. at 463.
711d. at 464. This was in keeping with contemporaneous circuit precedent. See United States
v. Molinares, 700 F.2d 647, 653 (11 th Cir. 1983).
72Johnson, 520 U.S. at 464.
731d.
74515 U.S. 506, 523 (1995).
75Johnson, 520 U.S. at 466.
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The Court disagreed. Applying the Olano analysis, the Court found that
because Johnson had not raised the issue below, 76 plain error review was
applicable. 7 The Court expressed doubt as to whether the failure to submit
an element of a crime to a jury was "structural. 78 While recognizing that
the logic of Sullivan was applicable because, as in Sullivan, there would be
no way to truly determine what a jury would have done if properly charged,
the Court reasoned that the closer analogy was to an improper jury
instruction: "The failure to submit materiality to the jury, as in this case,
can just as easily be analogized to improperly instructing the jury on an
element of the offense, . . . an error which is subject to harmless-error
analysis. 79
However, the Court reserved judgment on the question of whether the
failure to submit an element of a crime was structural, such that prejudice to
the defendant would be presumed, and instead concentrated on the fourth
element of the Olano plain error test: the effect of failing to correct the
error on the public reputation of the courts. 80  Johnson suggested a
shorthand standard for the public reputation portion of the Olano test.
"[T]he evidence supporting materiality was 'overwhelming.' Materiality
was essentially uncontroverted at trial and has remained so on appeal.'
Therefore the failure to instruct on the issue of materiality could not affect
76Because, of course, the decision upon which it relied did not then exist.
77Johnson, 520 U.S. at 467.
78id"
791d. at 469.
It is by no means clear that the error here fits within this limited class of
cases [structural error]. Sullivan v. Louisiana, the case most closely on point,
held that the erroneous definition of reasonable doubt vitiated all of the jury's
findings because one could only speculate what a properly charged jury
might have done.
Id.
8
°Id. at 469-70.
But we need not decide that question because, even assuming that the failure
to submit materiality to the jury affected substantial rights, it does not meet
the final requirement of Olano. When the first three parts of Olano are
satisfied, an appellate court must then determine whether the forfeited error
"seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings" before it may exercise its discretion to correct the error.
Id. (citations omitted).
811d. at 470.
2003]
BA YLOR LA W REVIEW
the public reputation of the courts. Although at the time this language
merely explained the Court's decision to find that the error at trial did not
affect the reputation for fairness or integrity of the courts, these words in
Johnson took on a life of their own in later cases and became the core
analysis by which courts now determine questions of plain error.
G. Neder v. United States
Sullivan, Olano, and Johnson set the stage for the Supreme Court's
decision in Neder, in which the Supreme Court held that the failure to
submit an element of a crime to the jury was not structural, and therefore
was subject to harmless error review.82 Ellis Neder was a Jacksonville
attorney who financed real estate transactions with fraudulently obtained
bank loans.83  He was indicted for mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1341, wire fraud § 1343, bank fraud § 1344, and filing a false income tax
return, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1).84 At trial, the court instructed
the jury to disregard the "materiality" of Neder's statements when deciding
the tax offenses because, the court determined, materiality was not a
question for the jury to decide.85
Neder held first that because the omission of an element would not
"always render a trial unfair," the error was not structural. 86 The Court
stated:
We have recognized that "most constitutional errors can
be harmless." If the defendant had counsel and was tried
by an impartial adjudicator, there is a strong presumption
that any other constitutional errors that may have occurred
are subject to harmless-error analysis .... The error at
issue here-a jury instruction that omits an element of the
offense-differs markedly from the constitutional
violations we have found to defy harmless-error review.87
82Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999).
83Id. at 4.
84Id. at 6.
851d.
861d. at 9.
871d. at 8. This holding continues to draw significant criticism, especially in light of the fact
that the decision flies in the face of Sullivan without overruling it. See Linda E. Carter, The
Sporting Approach to Harmless Error in Criminal Cases: The Supreme Court's "No Harm, No
Foul" Debacle in Neder v. United States, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 229, 232 (2001).
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The Court in Neder next chose a standard by which to measure whether
the error was harmless. Two tests, one subjective and one objective, had
emerged in the circuits for determining harmless error. The subjective test,
based on Chapman, looked to whether or not the error impacted the jury's
deliberations.88 For example, a court might be required to speculate as to
whether or not a given piece of inadmissible evidence figured into the
jury's decision to convict.89 The objective test considered whether or not
the evidence in favor of conviction was overwhelming such that no rational
jury could have failed to convict the defendant.90 The tests were elided by
some circuits; the D.C. Circuit used the effect-on-the-jury test for
constitutional error, while using the overwhelming evidence standard for
statutory error.91
Neder followed the general pattern of twentieth century jurisprudence,
and adopted the objective test, for several reasons. 92 First, the effect-on-
the-jury standard requires a counterfactual speculation about the actual jury
deliberations that courts dislike.93 Second, courts are overburdened, and
this problem is exacerbated by the subjective test because it is more
complex and lends itself less to the quick cleaning of dockets bloated by
appeals which must raise every conceivable claim in the first instance.94
Neder therefore picked out and polished the language in Johnson regarding
overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence:
In Neder, the Court applied a harmless error analysis to the failure to
instruct on an element of a crime. This case, more than any other in a series
of decisions expanding the role of harmless error analysis, severs the doctrine
from a principled mooring. Harmless error analysis depends on the existence
of a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on the elements of the crime.
The appellate court must assess the possibility that the error affected the
jury's verdict. If there is no verdict on an element of the crime, it is not
possible to conclude that the error did not affect the verdict.
Id.
88Jeffrey 0. Cooper, Searching for Harmlessness: Method and Madness in the Supreme
Court's Harmless Constitutional Error Doctrine, 50 KAN. L. REv. 309, 331 (2002).
891d. at 310.
9 Id. at 311.
911d. at 326-27.
92Neder, 527 U.S. at 9 (1999).
93Cooper, supra note 88, at 333.
"Cooper, supra note 88, at 333.
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Although reserving [in Johnson] the question whether the
omission of an element ipso facto "affects substantial
rights," we concluded that the error did not warrant
correction in light of "overwhelming" and
"uncontroverted" evidence supporting materiality. Based
on this evidence, we explained, the error did not "seriously
affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings."
95
Neder chose to apply this language in its harmless error analysis, despite
the fact that the reasoning of Johnson applied to the public reputation
portion of the plain error test, which is not a part of harmless error review.
96
The Court noted: "We believe that where an omitted element is supported
by uncontroverted evidence.., this approach reaches an appropriate
balance between 'society's interest in punishing the guilty [and] the method
by which decisions of guilt are to be made.
97
In sum, Neder had three holdings of consequence. Neder determined
that the failure to submit an essential element of a crime to the jury was trial
error, subject to harmless or plain error review as the presence or absence of
trial objections below dictate.98  Neder also applied Johnson's
overwhelming and uncontroverted language-developed in the plain error
context-to harmless error's review of a defendant's substantial rights. 99
Neder finally determined that an objective test-the overwhelming and
uncontroverted test-was superior to the actual impact on the jury method
of determining whether the defendant's substantial rights had been
prejudiced. 100
With Neder and Johnson, the overwhelming and essentially
uncontroverted test reached its current level of extraordinarily broad
applicability. Neder used the overwhelming and uncontroverted test as an
95Neder, 527 U.S. at 9. Neder drew its "overwhelming and uncontroverted" rule from Olano,
a plain error case. The "overwhelming and uncontroverted" standard for trial error may therefore
be applied in both plain and harmless error settings. However, it must be differently applied in
keeping with the different concerns of each type of review. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,
736 (1993).
96Neder, 527 U.S. at 18.
97 1d. (citations omitted).
981d. at 9.
991d.
'°Id. at 18.
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objective standard to review the impact a decision had on the jury.'01
Johnson used it to measure the extent to which failure to correct the error
would damage the public reputation of the courts.10 2 Both cases paved the
way for a new regime of review for error in the most commonly appealed
issues before modem courts of appeals: whether a sentencing factor that
increases a defendant's sentence is an essential element to be charged to the
jury, and whether the failure to submit that element to the jury may be
reversed on appeal.
III. THE APPRENDI DECISION AND THE FEDERAL DRUG REGIME
A. Apprendi v. New Jersey: Sentencing Factors and Essential
Elements of a Crime
Sentencing factors are factual findings-such as brandishing a firearm
during the commission of a robbery, or possessing certain large amounts of
drugs-not included in the criminal statute itself, that affect the sentence
that may be imposed on the defendant upon conviction. 0 3 For example,
though a defendant is found guilty of robbery, he may be subject to extra
years in prison if he used an automatic weapon in the commission of the
offense. Similarly, a defendant may be guilty of possessing drugs if he
possessed any measurable amount of a controlled substance, but he will be
subject to more time in prison, the more drugs he possessed.
Such sentencing factors have not historically been subject to the
Winship rule that every essential element of the crime charged must be
proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 10 4 Sentencing factors were
traditionally proven only to the judge-at a sentencing hearing following
conviction-subject to a preponderance of the evidence standard. Apprendi
was a vastly important decision because it recognized that some sentencing
factors were in fact essential elements of the crime charged that must be
submitted to the jury for proof beyond a reasonable doubt.10 5
1011d.
1021d.
103See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 86 (1986) (describing sentencing factors as
distinct from the essential elements of a crime).
1°41n re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970).
0 5Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 470 (2000).
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B. Facts of Apprendi
In the early morning of December 22, 1994, Charles Apprendi fired a
.22-caliber handgun into a house occupied by new African-American
owners. 106 He was upset because they had moved into the previously all-
white neighborhood. 10 7 When questioned, Charles Apprendi told police that
"because [the homeowners were] black in color he [did] not want them to
live in the neighborhood."'
0 8
Apprendi then agreed to a plea bargain, in which he pled guilty to two
counts of second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose,
and one count of third-degree unlawful possession of an antipersonnel
bomb. 109 However, the prosecution reserved the right to request that the
sentencing court impose an enhanced sentence under New Jersey's hate
crime law,"0 which allowed judges to impose additional terms of
imprisonment when a crime was committed out of racial bias."' The
combined maximum sentence for the underlying weapons offenses was
twenty years-ten years per weapons conviction. 1 2 This maximum could
be increased to thirty years if the judge determined that an enhancement for
racial bias was appropriate."
13
At an evidentiary hearing held to determine the purpose of the shooting,
the prosecutor presented the testimony of the interviewing officer, who
described Apprendi's statement to police with regard to Apprendi's racial
bias."14 Apprendi contested the officer's description of his statement to
police, and presented witnesses to testify that he did not have a reputation
for racial bias.' 15 Apprendi argued that he fired the shots because he had
been drunk, and not because of racial animus."16
The sentencing judge determined that the officer's testimony was more
believable, and therefore determined, based on a preponderance of the
'°6Id. at 469.
10 7
1d.
10O81d
0°9Id. at 469-70.
Id. at 470.
1"N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West 1995) (repealed 2001).
"
2 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469-70.
1
31d. at 468-70.
1d. at 470-71.
151d.
Id. at 471.
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evidence standard, that a sentencing enhancement under the hate-crime law
was appropriate.'17 The judge then imposed a twelve year sentence on one
of the firearm counts. 18 The judge imposed shorter, concurrent sentences
on the other two counts." 
9
On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed Apprendi's
conviction, stating that "[t]here is... no litmus test or unerring
'constitutional calculus' for determining what is an essential element of a
crime., 120  The court relied on United States Supreme Court precedent,
holding that "linking the severity of punishment to the presence or absence
of an identified fact [does] not automatically make that fact an element.' 11
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. 12 2 In
so doing, the Court established precisely the "litmus test" that the New
Jersey Supreme Court lacked. 2 3 Apprendi held that "[o]ther than the fact of
a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt."' 24  The Court further noted: "It is
unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of
facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal
defendant is exposed. It is equally clear that such facts must be established
by proof beyond a reasonable doubt."'
125
C. Apprendi and the Federal Drug Sentencing Regime
Apprendi was not a drug case. However, Apprendi is most often applied
in the federal drug sentencing context, where increases in the drug amount
correspond to increased ranges of penalties. The federal drug sentencing
1 71d.
1181d.
19 M. This fact in Apprendi, which differs from nearly every other case successfully brought
under the Apprendi rule, begins one of the most difficult aspects of the Apprendi analysis:
whether there has been an Apprendi violation when the sentence actually imposed was shorter
than the maximum sentence involved.
120State v. Apprendi, 731 A.2d 485, 491 (N.J. 1999), rev'd, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
I1 1d. at 491-92 (citing McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 84 (1986)) (quotations
omitted).
122Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 470 (2000).
12 3Id at 488.
124M. at 490.
1251d. (citing Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 252-53 (1999)).
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statutes are 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), (B), and (C). 126 Each sentencing
category contains its own range of applicable sentences and its own
requirements for the amount of drugs required to trigger the application of
that sentence. For example, section 841(b)(1)(C), the lowest echelon,
carries a sentencing range of zero to twenty years.' 2 7 Section 841(b)(1)(B)
has a sentencing range from five to forty, 2 8 and section 841(b)(1)(A)
mandates a sentence from ten years to life.' 29 Each one of the sentencing
echelons in the scheme requires a threshold drug amount. So, for example,
a defendant found with any detectable amount of crack cocaine can be
sentenced under section 841(b)(1)(C) to zero to twenty years in prison; a
finding of five grams of crack cocaine suffices for a sentence, under section
841(b)(1)(B), of five to forty years and a finding of fifty grams of crack
cocaine suffices for a sentence, under section 841(b)(1)(A), of ten years to
life. Although very small amounts of crack cocaine suffice for the highest
section 841 sentence bracket, more substantial amounts are required for
other drugs.
So, in the most common set of cases (drug cases sentenced under the
federal 21 U.S.C. § 841 statutes) a court's choice as to whether to apply
Apprendi or not causes a wide difference in applicable sentencing ranges.
A sentence under the minimum range, which courts can employ in the
absence of a jury finding of fact as to drug amount, is zero to twenty
years. 130  If the Apprendi error is deemed not reversible either by
application of the harmless error or plain error doctrines, sentences under 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) range from ten years to life.' 31
IV. DEVELOPING APPRENDI: SENTENCING FACTORS AND
SENTENCING GUIDELINES
A. Treatment of Sentencing Factors in Ring and Harris
Two more decisions, Ring v. Arizona and Harris v. United States,
handed down by the Supreme Court on June 24, 2002, should figure into
12621 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)-(C) (1999 & Supp. 2003).
127§ 841(b)(1)(C).
128§ 841(b)(1)(B).
129§ 841(b)(1)(A).
130§ 841(b)(1)(C).
31§ 841(b)(1)(A).
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any analysis of current trends in the interpretation of Apprendi132 First, the
cases describe in more-and sometimes opposing--detail which sentencing
factors should be considered essential elements of a crime under Apprendi.
Second, the cases open up a broad spectrum of important cases, including
extremely highly-counseled and hotly contested death penalty cases, to
review under Apprendi.
1. Ring v. Arizona: Death Sentence Aggravating Factors
In Ring v. Arizona, the Supreme Court applied Apprendi to aggravating
factors in death penalty cases.' 3 3 The Supreme Court analyzed Arizona's
death penalty system. Arizona's murder statute condemned those found
guilty of murder to death or life imprisonment. 34 However, the Supreme
Court had previously held that the death penalty could not be
constitutionally imposed without some finding of aggravating factors.
135
Under Arizona's death penalty scheme, once the jury had convicted the
defendant of first degree murder, a judge made the required findings of
aggravating factors as part of the sentencing proceedings. 136 The Supreme
'
32See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002).
133Ring, 536 U.S. at 588.
134. at 591.
135 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam) (holding the death sentence
may only be imposed within the confines of the Eighth Amendment when applied consistently).
136ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(G), amended by S.B. 1267, 46th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess.
(Ariz. 2003). This statute listed ten aggravating circumstances to be determined by a judge before
the death sentence could be imposed:
(1) The defendant has been convicted of another offense in the United States
for which under Arizona law a sentence of life imprisonment or death was
imposable.
(2) The defendant was previously convicted of a serious offense, whether
preparatory or completed.
(3) In the commission of the offense, the defendant knowingly created a
grave risk of death to another person or persons in addition to the persons
murdered during the commission of the offense.
(4) The defendant procured the commission of the offense by payment, or
promise of payment, of anything of pecuniary value.
(5) The defendant committed the offense as consideration for the receipt, or
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Court had, only ten years earlier, confirmed the constitutionality of the
Arizona death penalty scheme in Walton v. Arizona.137
Ring found the Arizona death penalty scheme unconstitutional, taking
the extraordinary step of overruling Walton, a fairly recent decision.'38 The
Court found the aggravating factors considered by the judge subjected the
defendant to greater penalties than would have been possible from the jury
verdict alone. 139 Arizona argued that the original statute set forth all of the
elements required to convict the defendant of the ultimate penalty: the
statute authorized death or life in prison for first degree murder. 140 Once a
in expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value.
(6) The defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or
depraved manner.
(7) The defendant committed the offense while in the custody of or on
authorized or unauthorized release from the state department of corrections, a
law enforcement agency or a county or city jail.
(8) The defendant has been convicted of one or more homicides, as defined
in § 13-1101, which were committed during the commission of the offense.
(9) The defendant was an adult at the time the offense was committed or was
tried as an adult and the murdered person was under fifteen years of age or
was seventy years of age or older.
(10) The murdered person was an on duty peace officer who was killed in the
course of performing his official duties, and the defendant knew, or should
have known, that the murdered person was a peace officer.
Id.
137497 U.S. 639, 655 (1990), overruled by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). "In
Walton... this Court held that Arizona's sentencing scheme was compatible with the Sixth
Amendment because the additional facts found by the judge qualified as sentencing
considerations, not as "elements of the offense of capital murder." Ring, 536 U.S. at 588.
3
'Ring, 536 U.S. at 589.
1391d. Although the Arizona statute would have permitted such a result on its face, such a
system would be unconstitutional under Furman. As a result, "[b]ased solely on the jury's verdict
finding Ring guilty of first-degree felony murder, the maximum punishment he could have
received was life imprisonment." Id. at 597.
'4°ld. at 603-04.
912 [Vol. 55:3
TO ERR IS HUMAN
jury had convicted the defendant of first degree murder, Arizona reasoned,
he was subject to the death sentence.1 41
However, the Supreme Court pierced the formal veil of the statute and
looked to the actual effect of Arizona's death penalty scheme. 142 Critical to
Ring's holding was the belief that Apprendi governs "even if the State
characterizes the additional findings made by the judge as 'sentencing
factors."", 143 Ring concluded: "Capital defendants, no less than non-capital
defendants, we conclude, are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on
which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum
punishment.' 144 Under Arizona's death penalty scheme, the judge was to
make a factual determination, the result of which was life or death for the
defendant. 45 The Court found that, as a practical matter, the judge's factual
determination subjected the defendant to a greater range of punishment, and
was thus barred by Apprendi1
46
2. Harris v. United States: The Rebirth of Sentencing Factors
In Harris v. United States, released the same day as Ring, a different
majority of the Supreme Court relied on the distinction between a
sentencing factor and an element of a crime in the context of determining
whether a mandatory minimum sentence was unconstitutional under
Apprendi147  Harris reviewed the sentencing framework under which
criminal defendants received enhanced prison sentences for possession of a
firearm in connection with a drug crime. 48  Under that framework, a
defendant was subject to certain minimum sentences for various forms of
conduct with the firearm.149 Simple possession of the firearm exposes a
defendant to five years in addition to the sentence for the underlying drug
crime. Brandishing the firearm earns a defendant a minimum of seven
Mld. at 604-05.
1421d. at 589.
1431d. (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 492 (2000)).
144Id.
14 5
1d
"
146Id.
147536 U.S. 545, 549 (2002).
148d. at 550-51; see generally 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)-(3) (1996 & Supp. 2003).
149Harris, 536 U.S. at 551.
"'o18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).
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years. "' Finally, discharge of the firearm subjects a defendant to a
mandatory minimum sentence of ten years.
52
The Court ruled that because the mandatory minimums were sentencing
factors, rather than elements of the offense, the factual determination of the
judge did not violate Apprendi 53  Harris held that a given factual
determination may be designated by the legislature as a sentencing factor or
an element of the offense.' 54  Harris indicated that the legislative
designation must stand unless the sentencing factor would permit a court to
sentence the defendant to a penalty more stringent than that authorized by
the statute of conviction. 55 Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), the judge had the
ability to sentence defendants to more than the mandatory minimums.'
56
Therefore, in making a finding of fact subjecting a defendant to mandatory
minimums, the judge was merely making a sentencing determination within
the range already approved by the jury's conviction.'57
Ring and Harris conflict to a significant degree.1 58 Both considered
single-sentence statutes that authorized, at first blush, the entire available
range of punishment. The factual determination of the judge subjected each
defendant to a higher penalty than he would have been subject to on the
jury's determination alone. 59 Harris treated that element as a sentencing
factor.' 6° Ring treated it as an element of the crime. 61 As courts contend
with Apprendi claims in new areas of the law, they must decide which of
these approaches to take: whether to pierce the veil of the statute to
determine that a sentencing factor is actually an element of the crime, or to
take the legislature at its word and decide that the factual determination is
actually a sentencing factor.
'
5 11d. § 924(c)(2).
"
521d. § 924(c)(3).
"
53Harris, 536 U.S. at 565.
154Id
'"Id at 554.
1618 U.S.C. § 924(c).
'
57Harris, 536 U.S. at 565.
158This is no moral failing on the part of the Court, rather the result of a multi-member
decisionmaker. For an excellent description of the multi-peakedness of preference that generated
opposite outcomes in Harris and Ring, see Andrew M. Levine, The Confounding Boundaries of
"Apprendi-Land": Statutory Minimums and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 29 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 377 (2002).
159Harris, 536 U.S. at 554.
16Id.
161Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 588 (2002).
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B. Application of Apprendi to the Sentencing Guidelines
The single greatest set of sentencing factors is the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. Unsurprisingly, courts and academics have begun to debate
whether Apprendi should apply to the Sentencing Guidelines. 62 There is,
perhaps, a legitimate question as to whether the logic of Apprendi (that
decisions of fact increasing the punishment to which the defendant is
subject implicate his right to a jury trial) could be applied to the
Guidelines. 63 However, as a matter of current law, it is clear both from
Apprendi and the Guidelines themselves that Apprendi cannot apply.
The issue is most often seen when defendants challenge role
enhancements. Under the Guidelines, a sentence may be enhanced several
levels for an aggravating, supervisory, or leadership role in the offense.1
64
Defendants then challenge the enhancements as violating Apprendi, arguing
that they are factual determinations that enhance their exposure to
heightened sentences.
The only case to affirmatively hold that Apprendi applies to the
sentencing guidelines is a District of Columbia decision, United States v.
Fields.165 In this case, a leadership role enhancement was applied to a
defendant who had played a prominent role in violent gang-related
activities. 166 Fields held: "Because the fact of [sic] leadership role may
increase a defendant's sentence beyond the prescribed statutory maximum,
Apprendi applies. Accordingly, the issue of leadership must be charged in
an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt." 1
67
Every circuit court opinion to address the question has disagreed with
Fields. 68  However, the majority of courts inadequately explain why
62See, e.g., Levine, supra note 158, at 380-81.
163See Levine, supra note 158, at 427-447, arguing that Apprendi ought to apply to any
factual determination that "has the effect, in real terms, of increasing the maximum or minimum
punishment beyond an otherwise acceptable range... must be submitted to a jury and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt" including guidelines determinations.
'6U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B 1.1-4 (2002).
165242 F.3d 393, 398 (D.C. Cir. 2001). This case has since been reheard and reversed to the
extent that it applies Apprendi to the Guidelines. United States v. Fields, 251 F.3d 1041, 104-44
(D.C. Cir. 2001).
'
66Fields, 242 F.3d at 395.
16'1d. at 398.
1
68See, e.g., United States v. Gallego, 247 F.3d 1191, 1201 (1 th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Jackson, 240 F.3d 1245, 1249 (10th Cir. 2001).
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Apprendi exempts the Guidelines. They generally rely on an Apprendi
footnote, which states: "The Guidelines are, of course, not before the
Court. We therefore express no view on the subject beyond what this Court
has already held."' 169 Of course, this footnote does not definitively establish
that Apprendi does not apply to Guidelines sentencing factors, it merely
reserves the question. Nevertheless, courts act as if the Apprendi dicta did
exempt the Guidelines from Apprendi analysis: "Because we have held
Apprendi does not apply to relevant conduct under the Guidelines, we hold
that there was no Apprendi error in the district court's failure to require the
jury to determine whether [the defendant] was a leader or organizer."'' 70
Similarly, in United States v. Jackson, the Tenth Circuit stated:
Citing Justice O'Connor's dissent, [appellant] argues
Apprendi overrules the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
including, specifically, those "portions of the Sentencing
Guidelines that allow a four level increase for being a
leader or organizer." This argument, too, lacks merit. A
dissenting opinion obviously does not constitute binding
precedent. More important, the Supreme Court majority
"specifically avoided disrupting the use or the adequacy of
the Sentencing Guidelines" by affirmatively stating in
Apprendi "'the Guidelines are, of course, not before the
Court.
,1 71
Both as a matter of precedent and logic, courts should not extend
Apprendi to the Guidelines, but for a different reason than that expressed by
these courts. 7 2 The Guidelines, by their own language, cannot allow or
require the imposition of a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum. 173
Section 5Gl.1(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines indicates that "where the
statutorily authorized maximum sentence is less than the minimum of the
applicable guideline range, the statutorily authorized maximum sentence
shall be the guideline sentence.' 74 In other words, the statutory maximum
169Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 497 n.21 (2000).
170Gallego, 247 F.3d at 1201 (citations omitted).
17'240 F.3d 1245, 1249 (10th Cir. 2001); accord United States v. Sullivan, 255 F.3d 1256,
1264-65 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that Apprendi does not apply to the sentencing guidelines
insofar as they increase the penalty under the statutory maximum)
172Compare Andrew M. Levine, supra note 158, at 382 for a cogent opposition to this view.
173U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5G1.1 (2002).
1741d.; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5G1.1 cmt.
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trumps the Guidelines in cases of conflict. And the rule of Apprendi limits
itself to those cases in which the factual determination subjects the
defendant to a penalty above the maximum authorized by the statute of
conviction.175 No determination under the Guidelines could ever permit a
court to exceed the statutory maximum of the statute of conviction. Courts
should rely less, therefore, on the Apprendi dicta preserving the Guidelines
for the time being, and more on the rule of Apprendi and the Guidelines
themselves in resolving this issue.
However, this conclusion does not resolve all questions in the
application of Apprendi to the Guidelines, and it is likely courts will still
have to review Guidelines cases for Apprendi error. For example, in the
Fourth Circuit's recent decision in United States v. Shaw the court
considered whether the statutory maximum or Guidelines sentence should
serve as the point of departure when the court decided to depart downward
from the Guidelines.'
76
In Shaw, the defendant entered into a plea bargain for drug
conspiracy. 77 The court calculated Shaw's Guidelines sentencing range at
360 months to life.17 8  The government entered a motion for downward
departure under Guidelines section 5kl.1 for substantial assistance provided
by Shaw to the government in its investigation and prosecution of other
members of the drug trafficking ring. 179 The court granted the motion, and
departed downward from the 360 month guidelines sentence to the 240
month maximum that Shaw could be sentenced for under 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)( 1 )(C).' 80  The end result was that the motion for downward
departure, although granted, had no effect on Shaw's actual sentence.'
8
'
This section describes how the statutorily authorized maximum
sentence... may affect the determination of a sentence under the guidelines.
For example, if the applicable guideline range is 51-63 months and the
maximum sentence authorized by statute for the offense of conviction is 48
months, the sentence required by the guidelines... is 48 months.
Id.
175Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 487 (2000).
176313 F.3d 219, 223-24 (4th Cir. 2002).
'Id. at 222-23.
1781d.
179 d.
180ld.
11 d.
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Shaw then appealed, arguing that Apprendi required the court to use the
statutory maximum as the point of departure for the reduction in sentence
for substantial assistance.
82
The panel agreed, but did not remand the case for re-sentencing because
Shaw had not established plain error.1 83  The court agreed that section
5G1.1 operated such that the statutory maximum of 240 months for a drug
conviction where drug amounts had not been submitted to the jury became
the Guidelines sentence.' 84 Nevertheless, the circuit relied on Cotton to
affirm, because Shaw had pleaded guilty and had allocuted (essentially
confessed at sentencing) to the requisite drug amounts. 185
Shaw recognized (as few cases have yet to date) that the Guidelines
themselves prohibit a sentence above the statutory maximum. But the case
nevertheless chose to categorize the failure of the district court to select the
statutory maximum as the starting point from which a downward departure
might begin as Apprendi error.' 86 This is probably incorrect. First, the final
sentence in the case was twenty years, the statutory maximum to which a
court may sentence a defendant without any jury determination
whatsoever. 187  Phrased slightly differently, Shaw was a challenge by a
defendant who (1) brought an Apprendi challenge regarding his twenty-year
sentence and (2) challenged the failure of the court to grant a downward
departure.1 88 The case involved no Apprendi error because a sentence of
twenty years does not implicate Apprendi and because a court of appeals
may not hear an appeal of a district court's failure to depart downward. 189
In other words, it was not clear that analysis for error was required at all.
As Shaw makes clear, although the Guidelines themselves are not
directly subject to Apprendi, courts will still need to review the intersection
1
821d.
'
83Id. at 223-24.
84Md. ("We agree with Shaw that 240 months was the applicable guideline sentencing range
by operation of § 5G 1. l(a), and that, as a result, 240 months should have served as the starting
point for any downward departure the district court exercised its discretion to grant.")
181See discussion of the application of Cotton to Apprendi error in the circuits infra Part VI.A.
at 926-30.
18'6Shaw, 313 F.3d at 233.
187See, e.g., United States v. Luciano, 311 F.3d 146, 149 (2d Cir. 2002) (affirming sentence of
less than twenty years, because under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), a court may impose a sentence of
up to twenty years without a jury finding as to drug amounts).
'
8 8Shaw, 313 F.3d at 222-23.
'
89See, e.g., Luciano, 311 F.3d at 149.
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between statutes and the Guidelines for Apprendi error.1 90 And, as in Shaw,
a clear understanding of the nature of Apprendi error review may save a
court unnecessary analysis. Finally, since the Guidelines apply to nearly all
criminal convictions, as courts continue to expand Apprendi analysis to new
areas, concerns about how those statutes interact with the Guidelines will
provide fresh challenges to the courts of appeals.
V. PROCEDURAL BARS TO APPRENDI CHALLENGES
As the above demonstrates, Apprendi is being applied to an increasingly
large range of statutes at the same time that-as discussed below-actual
relief under the doctrine is contracting because of procedural bars to
Apprendi claims and affirmances under the plain and harmless error
standards. 191  Ring is a perfect example. 192  Ring opened the door to
Apprendi challenges for every death row case in which the judge has made
a finding of an aggravating factor subjecting the defendant to the death
sentence: some 800 death sentences in nine states. 93 And recent court
determinations of the retroactive applicability of Apprendi render the
question of review of Apprendi error more important than ever. 194 Yet, at
'9°Shaw, 313 F.3d at 224.
'
91Courts are still parsing the ramifications of the Apprendi rule for statutes to which it clearly
applies. For example, courts are only now considering whether a range of drugs specified in the
indictment is sufficiently clear to permit conviction. See United States v. Moreci, 283 F.3d 293,
297 (5th Cir. 2002).
[T]he government charged Moreci with possessing or conspiring to possess
"more than 50 kilograms" of a marijuana mixture .... The question is,
whether this is sufficient to inform a defendant of the specific charges made
against him, including the quantity of drugs alleged for the purpose of
sentencing enhancements and what those enhancements may be, in
satisfaction of Apprendi. This is an issue of first impression in this circuit.
Id. at 297.
192See generally Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
193See http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=388&did=247. The actual number on
direct appeal is lower. Given that Ring is, in this author's opinion, likely not to be found
retroactive under the Supreme Court's decision in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), the
impact of Ring would be limited to those death penalty cases on direct appeal. However, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently held that Ring applies retroactively and at the time of
publication, the United States has granted certiorari. Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1084
(9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, sub. nom. Schriro v. Summerlin, No. 03-526, 2003 U.S. LEXIS
8574, at *1 (Dec. 1, 2003).
194Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1084 (applying Apprendi retroactively under Teague).
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the same time, the chances that any of these sentences will actually be
reversed under Apprendi is slim, even when the question is a matter of life
and death.
A. Second or Successive Habeas Petitions: AEDPA, Tyler, and
Apprendi
In stark contrast to the rapid expansion of Apprendi into new areas of
the law, procedural bars are limiting actual relief under Apprendi to fewer
and fewer appellants. First, defendants who have filed a prior habeas
corpus petition will find it impossible to receive a hearing on their Apprendi
claims. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)
contains a number of restrictions on the writ of habeas corpus itself; the
most important of these restrictions is that a prisoner may only file one
post-AEDPA habeas corpus petition. 95 A second or successive habeas
petition can only succeed if it is based on new evidence that was not
available at the original trial, which shows that the petitioner is innocent, or
if the claim is based on a new rule of law, the new rule of law is made
retroactive to cases on collateral (habeas) review.' 96
In Tyler v. Cain, the Supreme Court held that under AEDPA, a new rule
of law is only "made retroactive" to cases on collateral review when the
Supreme Court expressly states it should apply retroactively. 197 Apprendi
contained no such clear statement of retroactivity. Therefore, circuit courts
have determined that, under Tyler, second or successive habeas petitions
cannot be heard because of the limitations section of AEDPA. 1
98
'9'28 U.S.C. § 2244 (2000). AEDPA, which became effective on April 24, 1996, fixes a
one-year limitations period for federal habeas petitions by state prisoners. § 2244(d)(1); David v.
Hall, 318 F.3d 343, 344 (1st Cir. 2003). If a defendant was convicted prior to AEDPA, had a
pre-AEDPA petition, and filed a second or successive petition for habeas review within one year
of the date of passage of AEDPA, then that defendant would receive substantive review of his
second or successive petition as long as it did not violate the older abuse of the writ standard. See,
e.g., David, 318 F.3d at 344.
19628 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) (2000).
197533 U.S. 656, 662-63 (2001). Tyler concerned a sixth post-conviction habeas petition filed
after the Court had declared a certain type of jury instruction unconstitutional. Melvin Tyler had
been convicted on a similar instruction and brought a habeas petition seeking reversal of his
sentence. The Court noted: "Based on the plain meaning of the [statute] read as a whole, we
conclude that 'made' means 'held' and, thus, the requirement is satisfied only if this Court has
held that the new rule is retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review." Id. at 662.
198See, e.g., In re Clemmons, 259 F.3d 489 (6th Cir. 2001).
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B. First Habeas Petitions: Teague v. Lane
Even timely first habeas petitions are unlikely to receive much shrift
when asserting an Apprendi claim.'99 In Teague v. Lane, the Supreme
Court set forth a new standard for determining whether a new rule of
constitutional law should apply retroactively to cases on collateral (habeas)
review. 200 The Court held that new rules were not retroactively applicable
unless (1) the new rule "places 'certain kinds of primary, private individual
conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to
proscribe,' 20 1 or (2) the new rule establishes a watershed rule of criminal
procedure that "implicates the fundamental fairness of the trial," without
which "the likelihood of accurate conviction is seriously diminished.,
20 2
Courts have overwhelmingly rejected applying Teague to achieve a result
for first habeas petitions that Tyler would forbid for second or successive
203petitions.
The end result of Tyler and Teague is that a defendant who believes that
he was convicted without benefit of a full trial by jury cannot advance this
claim in a habeas proceeding-the purpose of which is to test unlawful
convictions. Yet even if a defendant was fortunate enough to have been on
199The term "habeas" is used here as a term of convenience. An initial petition for post
conviction relief from federal custody is, technically, not a habeas petition but a collateral attack
on the validity of federal custody. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000). Under section 2254, state custody
may be challenged in federal court if all questions have properly been exhausted before the state
tribunal. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000). For simplicity's sake, I will refer to both section 2255 initial
petitions for postconviction relief from federal custody and section 2254 attacks on state custody
as initial habeas petitions.
2'489 U.S. 288, 310-13 (1989).
20 11d. at 311 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971)).
2021n re Clemmons, 259 F.3d at 492 (citing Teague, 489 U.S. at 310-13).
2 03Curtis v. United States, 294 F.3d 841, 844 (7th Cir. 2002); Goode v. United States, 305
F.3d 378, 384-85 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Brown, 305 F.3d 304, 309 (5th Cir. 2002) (per
curiam) (Apprendi is not a Teague "watershed rule."); United States v. Mora, 293 F.3d 1213,
1219 (10th Cir. 2002); United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d 664, 668 (9th Cir. 2002);
McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d 1245, 1258 (1 1th Cir. 2001); United States v. Moss, 252 F.3d
993, 997 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Sanders, 247 F.3d 139, 151 (4th Cir. 2001); Burrell v.
United States, No. 97 CV 7358 (SJ), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18195, at *25-*26 (E.D.N.Y. Aug.
19, 2002) (on remand from the Second Circuit, holding Apprendi non-retroactive as applied to
initial habeas petitions); United States v. Enigwe, 212 F. Supp. 2d 420, 430-31 (E.D. Pa. 2001)
(noting that although the Third Circuit had not expressly decided the question of retroactivity on
first habeas petitions, sufficient authority existed to refuse a petition on those grounds); but see
Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1084 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, sub. nom. Schriro v.
Summerlin, No. 03-526, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 8574, at *1 (Dec. 1, 2003).
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direct review when the Apprendi decision was decided, the application of
plain and harmless error review to Apprendi cases has further narrowed
relief, such that obtaining re-sentencing under Apprendi is now nearly an
impossibility. This is not as it should be. Courts that think deeply about
plain error analysis under Apprendi, as outlined below, will come to the
conclusion that relief should be granted more liberally than is the current
practice of the circuits.
VI. UNITED STATES V. COTTON. APPLYING THE OVERWHELMING AND
ESSENTIALLY UNCONTROVERTED TEST TO APPRENDI ERROR
United States v. Cotton, decided in the summer of 2002, applied Neder's
objective overwhelming and uncontroverted standard to Apprendi error.2 4
Cotton held that plain error analysis should govern Apprendi cases on direct
appeal and adopted the Neder-Johnson overwhelming and uncontroverted
standard as the measure of that plain error review. 0 5 Cotton held that if a
court of appeals believes that there is overwhelming evidence of a
minimum threshold amount of drugs, it may affirm a sentence given under
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) or (B), even though a jury did not make a
decision as to drug amount.20 6
The facts of Cotton are representative of the usual Apprendi drug
conspiracy challenge. In Cotton, accused participants in a drug ring
207
challenged their convictions for drug conspiracy. The conspirators were
indicted for 21 U.S.C. § 841 possession with intent to distribute and 21
U.S.C. § 846 conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute.0 8 While a
drug amount (over fifty grams of cocaine base) was set forth in the first
indictment, a superseding indictment charged the defendants of conspiring
to possess and distribute any detectable amount of cocaine and cocaine
base.20 9 The defendants were sentenced under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) to
204535 U.S. 625, 633 (2002).
21d. at 633.
2061d. ("The evidence that the conspiracy involved at least 50 grams of cocaine base was
'overwhelming' and 'essentially uncontroverted.' Much of the evidence implicating respondents
in the drug conspiracy revealed the conspiracy's involvement with far more than 50 grams of
cocaine base.").
2171d. at 627-28.
2
°Id. at 627.2 9Id. at 627-28.
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sentences above twenty years, the statutory maximum for 21 U.S.C.§ 841(b)(1)(C). 210
At oral argument, the Court discussed the central practical matter of the
case: whether a defendant could legitimately be charged with having
waived a right under a case that did not yet exist at the time of the
defendant's trial. Counsel for respondent argued that a right of which the
defendant was unaware could not be effectively waived:
[T]he propositions and fundamental beliefs that all of us
went into the trial with are far different because none of us
could ever imagine that the Apprendi case was
forthcoming. Both Jones and Apprendi were decided while
this case was on direct appeal. So, I don't see how we
could forfeit an error that we could never even imagine
would-would result in __211
Justice Scalia responded: "Now, wait, wait, wait. It wasn't that much
of a bolt from the blue. 212 Justice Scalia continued to argue that although
Apprendi had been decided while Cotton was on appeal, the underlying jury
right grew out of the common law tradition and therefore, should have been
raised as an objection at trial, even without the example of Apprendi.213
Apparently Justice Scalia's view prevailed since the Court's written opinion
contained no discussion of the question.
The first holding of Cotton was that a defect in the indictment does not
214deprive the court of jurisdiction to hear the case. Prior to Cotton, the
2 10Id. at 628. Title 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(c) merely requires a finding of possession, not a
finding of a specified drug amount.
21'Transcript of Oral Argument at *30, United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002) (No.
01-687), available at 2002 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 34.
2 12
1d.
213This is, to me, an unconscious expression of sympathy for the philosophy of natural law,
most famously asserted in Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842) (permitting federal courts to base
decisions on a federal common law, founded on pre-existing but as-yet undiscerned legal
principles), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding that there is no
general federal common law). Although the modem trend has been to treat new rights as
new-minted, and applicable only going forward, under Justice Scalia's interpretation of the law,
defendants can be legitimately required to discern and raise objections based upon rights that are
pre-existing but undiscovered.
214U.S. v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630-31 (2002).
[Supreme Court precedent] confirm[s] that defects in an indictment do not
deprive a court of its power to adjudicate a case ....
20031
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Fourth Circuit had held, based on the nineteenth century decision Ex Parte
Bain, that a sentencing court lacked jurisdiction to sentence a defendant
when an essential element of the crime was not charged in the indictment.215
As a result, the Fourth Circuit found that the failure to properly allege the
drug amounts deprived the court of the ability to enter a sentence above the
statutory maximum.
In Cotton the Court first stated the general Olano framework for plain
error and concluded that for plain error to merit reversal, there must be (1)
error, which is (2) plain, and (3) affects the criminal defendant's substantial
rights.216 If each of those elements were met, an appellate court would be
able to exercise its discretion to determine whether (4) failing to correct the
error would negatively impact the public reputation of judicial
proceedings.1 7
Cotton's second holding adopted plain error analysis and applied
Neder's overwhelming and uncontroverted standard. The Court held that,
as in Johnson, no inquiry into the defendants' substantial rights was
required because the error did not affect the fairness and integrity of judicial
proceedings if the evidence of drug amounts was found to be
uncontroverted and overwhelming.218
Thus, this Court some time ago departed from Bain's view that indictment
defects are 'jurisdictional.' ... Insofar as it held that a defective indictment
deprives a court ofjurisdiction, Bain is overruled.
Id.
215See United States v. Hooker, 841 F.2d 1225, 1232 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc); see also Ex
parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 13 (1887).
2 16Cotton, 535 U.S. at 631.
2 171d.
2 181d. at 632-33. At oral argument, Justices Souter and Scalia both hinted that the failure to
adequately include every element of the crime in the indictment, or present it to the jury, would
constitute prejudice to the defendant's substantial rights. Justice Souter noted:
And that, Mr. Dreeben [counsel for the United States], seems to me a
substantial difference. So, I follow your argument at the-the very last step
in a plain error analysis, but you seem to stop short of that and you said there
wasn't any substantial difference. And I think that that's troublesome
because the disparity in sentencing is large.
Transcript of Oral Argument at *17, United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002) (No. 01-687),
available at 2002 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 34. Justice Scalia stated:
Mr. Dreeben, I-I'm not sure I-you say we should determine whether
substantial rights have been affected by-by asking whether if the procedure
[Vol. 55:3
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Finally, the Court found the evidence against the defendants was in fact
overwhelming and uncontroverted because the evidence of the weight of
drug amounts introduced at trial showed many multiples of the fifty grams
of cocaine base required to sustain defendants' convictions under 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(A). 21 9 First, the Court noted that the trial court had found one
defendant responsible for 500 grams of cocaine base, and the others
responsible for 1.5 kilograms-respectively 100 and 300 times the amount
of cocaine base necessary to sustain a sentence under 21 U.S.C
§ 841(b)(1)(A). 220 The Court looked at the drug amounts gathered by police
over the course of the conspiracy and the drug amounts directly testified to
by cooperating co-conspirators and concluded that "[s]urely the grand jury,
having found that a conspiracy existed, would have also found that the
conspiracy involved at least fifty grams of cocaine base. 221
Cotton, therefore, confirmed that Apprendi error was not to be treated as
structural error, although it undertook no analysis of the substantial rights of
respondents because they had failed to anticipate Apprendi and raise an
that has been omitted had not been omitted, he would have been-he would
have been convicted anyway. [T]hat seems to me extravagant. I mean,
that- that would mean that if there were no indictment at all, you just go to
the jury without an indictment and the jury convicts him of murder, you
could come in and say, well, his substantial rights weren't affected because
had there been a murder indictment, there was plenty of evidence to-to
convict him of murder.
Id. at *20.
219Cotton, 535 U.S. at 633.
2201d. at 628.
22
'Id. at 633. The Court stated:
Much of the evidence implicating respondents in the drug conspiracy
revealed the conspiracy's involvement with far more than fifty grams of
cocaine base. Baltimore police officers made numerous state arrests and
seizures between February 1996 and April 1997 that resulted in the seizure of
795 ziplock bags and clear bags containing approximately 380 grams of
cocaine base. A federal search of respondent Jovan Powell's residence
resulted in the seizure of 51.3 grams of cocaine base. A cooperating
co-conspirator testified at trial that he witnessed respondent Hall cook
one-quarter of a kilogram of cocaine powder into cocaine base. Another
cooperating co-conspirator testified at trial that she was present in a hotel
room where the drug operation bagged one kilogram of cocaine base into
ziplock bags.
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Apprendi-style objection at trial. From the exchange at oral argument, it
further seems that the Court agreed with Justice Scalia's position that plain
error is properly applied when a potential objection is founded in the
common law, even when the case definitively establishing the right has not
yet been decided. As a result, Cotton focused on the fourth element of plain
error review-the requirement that any error affect the integrity and public
reputation of judicial proceedings-and held that when the evidence of drug
weights was overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted, the conviction
should be affirmed. The remaining question for the circuits, therefore, was
what considerations should weigh into the determination that evidence of
drug amounts was overwhelming and uncontroverted.
A. Conceptual Problems in Applying the Overwhelming and
Uncontroverted Standard
Following Cotton, the circuits are now in the process of defining
overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted when reviewing convictions
for Apprendi error. Without some guiding principle, the Cotton standard
will become a justification rather than a reason for affirming a sentence.
There are three distinct practical problems. First, under the pre-Apprendi
regime, a defendant's objections to drug amounts could only be raised in a
sentencing hearing. Courts must decide whether an objection to a drug
amount at sentencing is simply that-a challenge to drug amounts-or
whether it should be read as raising an Apprendi objection at the trial
level.222 Second, in determining what weight of evidence is overwhelming,
courts must first decide whether the evidence is properly attributed to that
defendant and then determine both the quality and quantity of the evidence.
Finally, the evidence of responsibility for drug amounts is always contested.
If courts are to apply the Cotton rule effectively, they must establish
parameters for determining how much controversy is necessary before a
given block of evidence is no longer essentially uncontroverted.
222The difference in characterization of a drug-amount objection raised at sentencing means
the difference between remand. United States v. Strayhorn, 250 F.3d 462, 464 (6th Cir. 2001),
overruled by United States v. Leachman, 309 F.3d 377 (6th Cir. 2002), and affirmed by United
States v. Lopez, 309 F.3d 966 (6th Cir. 2002).
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1. Controverted or Harmless: Distinguishing an Objection on
Drug Amounts from Raising an Apprendi Objection
First, before a court can even decide whether to apply the overwhelming
and uncontroverted standard, it must determine whether the defendant
preserved the question for review by objecting below. When a defendant
objects to drug amounts below, courts have held that he has effectively
made an Apprendi objection (especially in cases that pre-dated Apprendi,
such that any objection could not be by name).223
Two contrasting Sixth Circuit cases frame the issue nicely. In United
States v. Strayhorn, the Sixth Circuit considered the fact that "Strayhom
specifically and repeatedly expressed reservations about the amount of
marijuana that would be attributed to him by the district court during the
sentencing phase" to be sufficient objection to preserve an Apprendi
objection for review on appeal. 4
United States v. Lopez held the opposite: that a defendant must raise the
precise Apprendi objection for the court to consider; merely objecting to the
amount of drugs at trial is not enough.225 Lopez held that because
defendants' sentencing hearings fell after Jones v. United States, the
defendants should have raised an Apprendi-style objection under Jones;
their failure to do so, reasoned the court, meant that the decision would be
reviewed for plain error.226
Within the overall scheme of things, the Strayhorn approach is correct
on the spirit, and the Lopez approach is correct on the law. Under Cotton, a
defendant (such as Strayhorn) who vigorously disputes the drug amount
223See, e.g., Strayhorn, 250 F.3d at 464 (vacating and remanding for re-sentencing in light of
Apprendi on a harmless error standard where the defendant objected to drug amount
determinations below).
224 1d. at 467
Contrary to the government's assertions that Strayhom's constitutional
challenge was waived, we believe the record makes plain that Strayhom
preserved his challenge by repeatedly objecting to the drug quantity
determination at his plea hearing and at his sentencing hearing ... Although
he did not utter the words "due process" at either of these hearings, he made
it well known that he disputed the district court's factual finding with respect
to drug quantity.
Id.
225See Lopez, 309 F.3d at 969-70 (6th Cir. 2002) (relying on Cotton to distinguish Strayhorn).
261d at 969.
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determination at trial should be deemed to have raised sufficient
controversy on the issue to permit reversal and remand under the Cotton
test. in that sense, Strayhorn reached the right result by the wrong method.
But Lopez dovetails much more neatly with the Supreme Court's analysis in
Cotton, especially considering that, at oral argument, the Cotton Court
seemed to believe that Jones was a sufficient warning of the upcoming
Apprendi decision to tax defendants with the burden of having to raise an
objection at trial.
2. Overwhelming: Scope of the Conspiracy for Purposes of
Determining the Drug Amount Determination and the Quality
versus Quantity Problem.
a. Conspiracy and Apportionment
Courts first must determine whether the weight of evidence against a
defendant is overwhelming. The majority of courts simply look to the
evidence of drug amounts introduced at the sentencing hearing and add up
weights. If the weight of evidence that was adduced at the sentencing
hearing was significantly higher than the amount required to support the
defendant's conviction, the court affirms, convinced that the evidence of
drug amounts was overwhelming.
The Cotton rule raises a troubling issue: a jury could convict for
conspiracy without a finding as to the scope of the conspiracy or without
any decision as to what drugs actually count as evidence against the
defendant. Courts should, therefore, be concerned about finding
overwhelming evidence where there is no indication that the jury
necessarily agreed with the scope of the conspiracy charged or considered
that evidence even remotely relevant to their determination of guilt for
conspiracy.
One very strong counterargument to this view of conspiracy cases is
that, in conspiracy cases, the jury actually convicts the defendant of
conspiracy, and that therefore any drugs attributable to the conspiracy
should be properly counted as part of the weight of the evidence against the
defendant. This does not solve the problem, however. Under the pre-
Apprendi regime, juries were not required to decide the scope of the
conspiracy in order to convict a defendant of drug conspiracy. In fact, there
was no need for the jury to consider drug quantities at all. Evidence of drug
amounts was reserved for the sentencing hearing. To argue, therefore, that
the jury convicted on a conspiracy, the scope of which included all drug
[Vol. 55:3
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amounts appearing at sentencing, cannot be correct: the jury in most cases
never heard that evidence, much less made any determination based upon
it. 2
27
Cotton rested on the fact that, given the large amounts of uncontestable
evidence amassed against the conspirators, the grand jury surely would
have indicted the defendants for the requisite drug amounts.228 Therefore,
Cotton does not absolve courts from considering whether the jury could
have convicted the defendant for a conspiracy of lesser scope-elimination
of that possibility is part and parcel of a determination that the jury surely
would have convicted of a large enough conspiracy to support the
sentence.22 9
United States v. Carrington 23  is a good example. Carrington
considered the Apprendi challenge of a defendant who vigorously contested
his participation in a drug conspiracy at trial. 231' Defendant Carrington was
convicted of drug conspiracy for accompanying a group of people
purchasing cocaine in New York City and transporting the drugs to
Charlottesville, Virginia.232  While the conspiracy was quite large,
involving at various times between eight and ten people and multiple trips
to purchase cocaine over a period of years, at Carrington's trial, the
government presented evidence of only two overt acts in furtherance of the
conspiracy.23 3
At trial, Carrington vigorously contested his involvement in the
234conspiracy. He was convicted, and the conviction was affirmed on
227See United States v. Bartholomew, 310 F.3d 912, 926-27 (6th Cir. 2002) (despite
conviction for conspiracy, restricting evidence to that directly applicable to the defendant, and
noting that other evidence of drug amounts was only before the court for sentencing purposes, not
before the jury for purposes of conviction, the court concluded that the sentence constituted plain
error).
228 5ee id. (restricting analysis of evidence for purposes of "overwhelming" analysis to drug
evidence directly attributable to the defendant).
229See id. The Second Circuit has used this analysis in a slightly different context. Under the
Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Barnes, 158 F.3d 662, 672 (2d Cir. 1998), when a
jury returns a general verdict of drug conspiracy on an indictment that charges several different
drug types, the trial court must sentence the defendant as if convicted of a conspiracy that
involved only the substance that carries the lowest sentencing range.
230301 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2002).
2311d. at 206-07
2321d. at 206.
23 31d. at 206-07.
2 34
1d
"
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appeal.235 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded in light of
Apprendi.236 On remand, the Fourth Circuit again affirmed the conviction.
Reviewing for plain error under Cotton, the court noted that the government
had introduced evidence at trial that Carrington was linked to two of the six
overt acts charged in connection with the overall conspiracy.237
A jury need not decide the scope of the conspiracy (and, by extension,
the applicable drug amounts) to convict of conspiracy.238 When, therefore,
the members of a conspiracy have contested drug amounts generally, and
the evidence of connection between a specific defendant and a certain
amount of drugs is less than overwhelming, courts should restrict their
analysis of the weight of the evidence to those drugs which no rational jury
could have avoided attributing to the defendant.239
b. Quantity versus Quality of Evidence
Next, courts must be cautious not to substitute quantity of evidence for
quality. In the drug context, nebulous evidence of a large amount of drugs,
admissible at trial on a mere relevance standard, should not take the place of
overwhelming and uncontroverted proof of the requisite threshold amount
of drugs. Similarly, evidence relied upon by the judge to make his
sentencing determination has only been proven by a preponderance of the
evidence. Under Cotton, the reviewing court must make its own
determination as to the quality of the evidence and not merely rely on
impressive amounts of drugs adduced at trial.
This is not to say that relevant evidence introduced at trial and relied
upon by the judge at sentencing cannot meet Cotton's overwhelming and
uncontroverted requirement. Rather, not all such evidence does so. Indeed,
if we were to assign (concededly arbitrary) mathematical values to the
standards, we might set the relevance standard at about twenty percent
(tending to establish the proposition for which it is asserted), the
235United States v. Martin, No. 99-4471, No. 99-4537, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 7334, at *1
(4th Cir. Apr. 21, 2000) (per curiam).
2 6Carrington, 301 F.3d at 208.
237 1d at 209.
238See United States v. Bartholomew, 310 F.3d 912, 926-27 (6th Cir. 2002) (restricting
analysis of evidence for purposes of "overwhelming" analysis to drug evidence directly
attributable to the defendant).
239See id. at 926 ("Other evidence presented at trial as to the amount of marijuana involved in
the conspiracy was also disputed by the defendants.").
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preponderance standard at fifty-one percent, and the reasonable doubt
standard (the least quantifiable) at somewhere around ninety percent.
Overwhelming proof must be still higher. For courts to rely on evidence
that is only part of the record because of its relevance to establish
overwhelming proof of drug amounts invites erroneous decisions.
3. Uncontroverted: Witness Evidence, Bias, and Duplicative
Testimony
Most convictions are won on witness testimony, which is, without fail,
contested by defendants either as mistaken or biased. This cannot mean
that every case based on witness testimony fails the Cotton test. Any
inquiry into the degree of controvertedness of witness evidence bearing on
an essential element of the crime charged inevitably runs afoul of this
problem: while the Cotton-Neder test speaks in absolute terms (the
evidence must be uncontroverted), the analysis is necessarily one of degree,
not of type. In applying the standard, courts must consider a defendant's
challenges, at trial, to credibility and content of witness testimony to
determine whether the defendant's objection could have raised a reasonable
doubt with a jury.240
A court's analysis is further complicated by the fact that most objections
to drug amounts are made at the sentencing hearing. A defendant's
objection to drug amounts are most often contained in objections submitted
to the presentence report. One common objection to presentence reports is
that witness testimony is duplicative when many witnesses testify to the
same transaction. The very number of witnesses that may make a case
based on witness testimony compelling at trial invariably raises the question
of whether two witnesses may have described the same transaction or
amount of drugs. This is inevitable: duplicative evidence is of great use in
confirming probability of a given fact, for example, that a given defendant
dealt drugs. However, the more duplicative evidence is used, the more
likely some portion of it will overlap.
B. Post-Cotton: Application of Cotton and Apprendi by the Circuits
Although the Cotton rule clearly makes it more difficult for defendants
who were unconstitutionally convicted to obtain remands of their sentences,
the rule by no means should operate only to affirm unconstitutional
24
.See id at 922.
20031
BAYLOR LAW REVIEW
sentences. 241 Current applications of Apprendi and Cotton are best
understood in terms of a continuum of certainty regarding the correct
outcome of the case. At one end of the spectrum, courts have found cogent
ways of explaining that in certain common types of appeals, no Apprendi
violation actually occurred. Next along the continuum are cases in which a
jury did not make a formal finding as to the omitted element of the crime,
but the court is able, nonetheless, to discern that the jury in fact decided the
issue. Similarly, courts affirm when a defendant's allocution to drug
amounts in a plea hearing definitively settled the drug amount question.
Finally come the gray-area cases in which courts apply the rule of Cotton to
weigh the evidence against a defendant and determine whether it was
indeed overwhelming and uncontroverted. Of this last type, the majority of
courts affirm the sentence. Most of these affirmances are correct
applications of the Cotton rule, but a significant minority are erroneous and
bear examination.
1. Concurrent and Consecutive Sentences
The first trend in modem cases is not as much an application of the
Cotton rule as it is a decision not to apply Apprendi analysis at all.
24'For example, Cotton is more of a pro-defendant rule than the pre-existing circuit rules for
plain error. The circuits did not wait until the Supreme Court's decision in Cotton to begin
applying plain error review of Apprendi error. United States v. Vazquez, which presaged Cotton
by nearly a year, is a good example. 271 F.3d 93 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc). Vazquez affirmed a
drug conviction despite conceded Apprendi error because the defendants' substantial rights were
not impacted when the evidence conclusively established the amount of drugs beyond a
reasonable doubt, and because the public reputation of the courts was not drawn into question by
such an affirmance. Id. at 96. Vazquez required that the defendant show that his sentence would
have been different had the drug amount been properly charged before the jury. Id at 99. The
court stated: "[T]he evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that Vazquez had been
involved with 992 grams of powder cocaine and 859 grams of crack cocaine. Indeed... there
[was never] any question about the amount." Id. at 104. The court concluded: "In these
circumstances, we can say without a doubt that Vazquez conspired to possess and/or distribute the
[drugs]." Id.
Cotton can therefore operate to the benefit of a defendant. While Cotton does require a
showing that the drug amount was "overwhelming" and "essentially uncontroverted," Vazquez
and similar cases require a showing that the jury would in fact have made such a finding of drug
amounts that the defendant's sentence would have been different on remand. While both of these
constructions fit within Olano's suggestion that a defendant's substantial rights are affected if the
error impacts the jury's deliberations, the question is one of degree. At least on a plain reading,
Cotton requires the sincere possibility of a different result, whereas Vasquez and earlier cases
would require a different result.
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Apprendi itself granted remand even though the actual sentence imposed
was less than the combined statutory maximum for the two firearms
counts. 242 Charles Apprendi's actual sentence was twelve years; the Court
reversed this sentence even though the combined statutory maximum of the
firearms counts was twenty years-ten years each.243
The circuits have not followed Apprendi in this respect and affirm
sentences exceeding the statutory maximum for one crime, when the sum of
the sentences that could have been imposed, absent a jury determination of
the sentencing factor, equals or exceeds the actual sentence imposed.
244
Thus, when the actual sentence imposed could have been reached by
stacking consecutive sentences rather than by enhancing one concurrent
sentence under a sentencing factor, courts will affirm.245 The first step,
therefore, for a court hearing an Apprendi challenge is to determine whether
the sentence actually imposed is below the statutory maximum for the
sentence that the judge could have imposed without any additional factual
finding by the jury. The second step is to determine whether there were
sufficient multiple convictions that, upon remand, the trial court could re-
sentence the defendant to the same sentence by using consecutive, rather
than concurrent sentences. If neither of these are true, courts then proceed
to apply harmless error review (if the defendant raised an Apprendi
objection below) or plain error review (if they did not), based on the
Johnson-Neder overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted standard.
These cases fall into several categories, discussed below.
242Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 497 (2000).
2 4 3Id. at 470. Charles Apprendi pled guilty to two counts of second degree possession of a
firearm for an unlawful purpose, and one count of third-degree unlawful possession of an
antipersonnel bomb. The trial court then enhanced the sentence based on its finding, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that Apprendi acted to intimidate his victims because of their race.
Id. at 469-71.
244See United States v. Martin, 49 Fed. Appx. 418, 419 (4th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) ("We
need not, however, conduct the plain error analysis that was conducted in Cotton because in this
case, there are multiple counts of conviction, and the Sentencing Guidelines require the sentencing
court to impose consecutive sentences to the extent necessary to achieve a sentence within the
guidelines range.") (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5G1.2(d) (2000) and
United States v. White, 238 F.3d 537, 542-43 (4th Cir. 2001)). Martin, therefore, held that
because the defendant had been convicted for three separate offenses, each subject to sentencing
under section 841(b)(1)(C) (imposing a statutory maximum of twenty years) even without a jury
amount determination, the statutory maximum that would trigger an Apprendi violation was a
sentence over sixty years. Id. at 419-20. As this demonstrates, Charles Apprendi's sentence was
not in fact a violation of the rule set forth in Apprendi.
24 5Martin, 49 Fed. Appx. at 419-20.
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2. Actual Jury Findings and Plea Allocutions
First, courts are most comfortable affirming sentences in cases in which
(1) the verdict makes clear that the jury did consider the drug amounts but
did not do so expressly, or (2) in which the defendant has entered a plea
bargain and has allocuted to the specific drug amount. In these cases,
courts determine that the error is truly harmless: the jury actually made the
relevant determination, or the defendant waived his right to jury trial on the
given element.
For example, in United States v. Reyes, the Sixth Circuit reviewed the
convictions of three drug dealers who raised Apprendi challenges for the
first time on appeal.246 At trial, the defendants were charged and convicted
on multiple counts. Although the first count of the indictment alleged that
the defendants had violated 21 U.S.C § 841(b)(1)(A), which requires a
finding that the defendants were responsible for more than five kilograms of
cocaine, at trial, the court instructed the jury only to consider whether the
defendants were responsible for any measurable amount of cocaine.247 This
was the basis for the defendants' Apprendi challenge on appeal.
However, as the Sixth Circuit noted, the third count of the indictment,
on which defendants had also been convicted, was a drug-related murder
count under 21 U.S.C. § 848 (e)(1)(A).248 In order to convict on the third
count, the jury was required to make an express finding that the defendants
in question had violated section 841(b)(1)(A), including the fact that the
defendants were responsible for more than five kilograms of cocaine.249
Applying plain error review under Cotton, the court concluded: "In the
current case, we have no need to speculate whether the jury would have
found that the drug conspiracy charged in Count 1 involved five or more
24651 Fed. Appx. 488, 495 (6th Cir. 2002) (per curiam).
21d. at 495-96.
248Title 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(l)(A) (2000) reads:
[A]ny person engaging in or working in furtherance of a continuing
criminal enterprise, or any person engaging in an offense punishable under
section 841(b)(1)(A) ... who intentionally kills or counsels, commands,
induces, procures, or causes the intentional killing of an individual and such
killing results, shall be sentenced to any term of imprisonment, which shall
not be less than 20 years, and which may be up to life imprisonment, or may
be sentenced to death.
249Reyes, 51 Fed. Appx. at 496.
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kilograms of cocaine: the jury actually made such a finding as part of the
Count 3 conviction. '25 °
Similarly, courts are and should be comfortable affirming sentences
without a jury determination as to drug amount when the defendant pleads
guilty and confesses to the drug amount at the sentencing hearing. "[I]n a
guilty plea setting, error may be avoided even absent a fact-finder's beyond
a reasonable doubt conclusion as to drug quantity if the defendant has given
an 'allocution that settles the issue of drug quantity."' 251  The Court's
decision in Cotton indicates that an Apprendi error may be waived by
failing to raise it below. A fortiori, when a defendant intentionally waives
the right to have the drug issue tried, the court may respect that decision,
and affirm the sentence.252
3. Challenge Unrelated to the Element
Another type of case-not quite as strong as those in which the jury has
decided or the defendant has allocuted to the drug amount-affirms the
conviction because the element of the crime not presented to the jury has
nothing to do with defense strategy chosen by the defendant at trial. A
good example is the Third Circuit's decision in United States v. Knight.
253
In that case, a jury convicted the defendant of drug conspiracy and
possession under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 & 846 without making any
determination as to drug amounts. The defendant was convicted, and the
Third Circuit affirmed on appeal. The defendant appealed to the Supreme
250
d.
2-1United States v. Doe, 297 F.3d 76, 89 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Yu, 285
F.3d 192, 198 (2d Cir. 2002)); accord United States v. Roldan-Hemandez, 41 Fed. Appx. 576,
577-78(3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam); United States v. Schaar, 45 Fed. Appx. 264, 264-65 (4th Cir.
2002) (per curiam).
252But see United States v. Rebmann, 226 F.3d 521, 524 (6th Cir. 2000).
We conclude that pursuant to her plea agreement, Rebmann waived her right
to a jury trial of the issue of whether her distribution of heroin caused the
death. However, we find that Rebmann did not waive the right to have a
court decide any remaining elements of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt, as opposed to making those determinations by a mere preponderance
of the evidence.
Id.
253See generally 50 Fed. Appx. 565 (3d Cir. 2002).
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Court, which granted certiorari and remanded the case in light of
Apprendi.
254
On remand, the Third Circuit again affirmed the conviction, this time in
light of Cotton. The court noted:
This jury's verdict clearly establishes that it was convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt that Knight did conspire to
possess with intent to distribute, and did distribute, cocaine
base. His defense did not go to the amount of drugs
involved. He argued that he was not involved in a
conspiracy to distribute illegal drugs at all. The jury
obviously rejected that argument.255
The court reasoned that the jury's finding that the defendant was involved
with the requisite amount of cocaine was satisfied by the jury's finding that
the defendant was involved with the conspiracy. Yet, as discussed above,
this rationale is troubling, since the jury in fact was never presented with
the question of drug amount, nor did the finding of conspiracy implicitly
indicate any finding as to drug amount.
4. Affirmances after Weighing Evidence
The most common type of Cotton case balances the weight of the
evidence of drug amounts against any objections to the admission (at trial)
or applicability (at sentencing) of the evidence. 256  Nearly every case
254 Id. at 566.
25 51d. at 568.
256See, e.g., United States v. Byrd, 55 Fed. Appx. 115, 118 (4th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
We find, however, that any resulting error did not seriously affect the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings, based on the
overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted evidence presented at the
guilty plea hearing and at sentencing indicating that Byrd was responsible for
far more than the 500 grams of cocaine necessary to sentence him under 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B), which authorizes a forty-year maximum term of
imprisonment.
Id. (citations omitted); United States v. Shaw, 313 F.3d 219, 224 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v.
McGill, 50 Fed. Appx. 602, 605-06 (4th Cir. 2002) (per curiam); United States v. Melvin, 48
Fed. Appx. 63, 65 (4th Cir. 2002) (per curiam); United States v. Graham, 48 Fed. Appx. 46, 48
(4th Cir. 2002) (per curiam); United States v. Pauley, 304 F.3d 335, 336 (4th Cir. 2002) (per
curiam); United States v. Vereen, 46 Fed. Appx. 138, 140 (4th Cir. 2002) (per curiam).
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affirming a conviction despite conceded Apprendi error engages in this
analysis to some degree. However, courts have pursued this balancing
analysis very close to, and in some cases over, the line of the Cotton rule.
Cotton is an example of the proper application of the balancing
approach. There, the weight of drug amounts was sixty times the amount
necessary to support the sentence that the defendants received. 57 However,
the Court did not rely only on the amount, but also the quality of the
evidence. 8 The court noted that approximately 380 grams of cocaine base
had been directly recovered by police, and that the defendants, as the
ringleaders of the conspiracy, would surely have been indicted by the grand
jury on the entire amount.259 Finally, the Court noted that eyewitnesses had
confirmed further amounts of drugs.260 Thus, the Court examined (1) the
quality of the evidence, (2) the quantity of evidence meeting the quality test,
(3) the proper attribution of that evidence to the defendants, and (4)
concluded to a certainty that the jury would agree.
Not all opinions follow these steps; instead, Cotton becomes an excuse
to affirm without close analysis. For example, in United States v.
Campbell, the Third Circuit found that a defendant cannot satisfy the
substantial rights or public reputation elements of plain error review when
the defendant presented a defense as to drug amount but not as to the
correct limit.261 The court stated: "Though Campbell's attorney sought to
establish doubt as to whether the crack cocaine equaled or exceeded 50
grams, there was no dispute that the crack cocaine weighed at least 5
grams.' 262 This is parsing the Cotton rule too closely. One central intuition
of an Apprendi challenge is that the indictment must correctly reflect the
elements of the crime that are to be proven before the jury so that the
defense can focus its efforts appropriately. It is easier to raise doubt as to
whether the case involved fifty grams of cocaine than it is to raise doubt
about five, but that is not to say that the defense could not have risen to the
occasion had it been properly informed of the nature of the challenge.
The Fourth Circuit's recent decision in United States v. McGill is a good
example of how this approach can overstep the Cotton line.263 McGill
257United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 628 (2002).
2581d. at 633.
2591d
26 0
d.
261295 F.3d 398, 404-05 (3d Cir. 2002).
26 2
1d.
263See generally 50 Fed. Appx. 602 (4th Cir. 2002) (per curiam).
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considered an Apprendi challenge to a drug conspiracy conviction for
distribution of marijuana. 264  The panel reviewed for plain error since
McGill failed to challenge the indictment or jury instructions on drug
26quantity. 65 The court stated the Cotton standard and then attempted to
determine whether the "evidence supporting the conclusion that the
narcotics conspiracy involved a threshold drug quantity was 'overwhelming
and essentially uncontroverted.'
266
McGill found that "[t]he evidence at the trial of this matter demonstrated
the extraordinary scope and pace of drug sales involved in this
conspiracy. 267  The court referenced a videotape that demonstrated the
pace of sales at the conspirator's base of operations and witness testimony
describing an even quicker pace of sales in other years. The court noted
that "[t]he government arguably demonstrated that marijuana sales [at the
location] approached ten pounds per day. 268
The defendant argued that the evidence against him was not
overwhelming or uncontroverted.269 Indeed, he had contested the drug
amounts at the presentence hearing, which was the first time in the case that
the issue of amounts arose between the parties.270 The court, nevertheless,
found that, under Cotton, the evidence was sufficiently overwhelming and
uncontroverted to merit affirmance: "That McGill objected to the drug
quantity calculations in the presentence report and at the sentencing hearing
does not change this court's analysis, nor does it preclude this court from
affirming the district court's well-founded determinations as to the amounts
of marijuana. ,.27 1 This determination is simply incorrect; the fact that
the evidence of drug amounts was not uncontroverted should have led the
264Marijuana is treated slightly differently under the federal drug sentencing regime. There is
actually a lower echelon for unspecified amounts of marijuana that carries a statutory maximum of
five years. Title 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D) (1999 & Supp. 2003). Therefore, despite the fact that
McGill's sentence was under twenty years, because there was a still lower "catchall" sentencing
provision available, McGill could legitimately argue that the failure to instruct the jury as to drug
amounts was an Apprendi error.
2 65McGill, 50 Fed. Appx. at 604.
266Id. (quoting United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 633 (2002)).
2671d
26 81d. at 605 n.2.
26 91d. at 605.
270Under the pre-Apprendi regime, since drug amounts were sentencing factors determined
before a judge on a predominance standard, the question of drug amounts arose before the judge at
the sentencing hearing rather than at trial.
2711d. at 605.
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court to either remand or at least closely examine the objection below. 272
While it would be entirely reasonable to affirm a sentence despite an
objection below if, for example, the objection was completely frivolous, the
McGill court did not analyze the nature or weight of the objection at all.
Regardless of the outcome, the objection below should have changed the
court's analysis, but it did not.
McGill demonstrates the pitfalls of simply considering the quantity,
rather than the quality, of the evidence of drug amounts. Courts seduced by
massive amounts of drug evidence that never appeared before the jury will
make similar mistakes. The quality, applicability, and provenance of the
evidence must be scrutinized, and only that evidence which is truly
uncontestable can be counted. If the court determines that the truly
uncontestable drug amounts are properly applied as against that defendant,
then, and only then, is the sentence properly affirmed under Cotton.
5. Vacation and Remand
In a few cases, however, courts have applied Cotton to benefit a
defendant. United States v. Doe appeared to be a core Apprendi case for
affirmance.273  The defendant, a foreign national, was apprehended
attempting to import narcotics into the United States.274 He entered into a
plea bargain with federal prosecutors, and he also allocuted to importing
275
and possessing the narcotics, but not specifically to drug amounts.
The Second Circuit found, based on Cotton, that the failure to submit
276the question of drug amounts to the jury constituted plain error. The case
concerned a plea bargain under which the defendant pled guilty to
importing narcotics into the United States, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 960(a), the structure of which mirrors the standard federal drug statute,
section 841.277 Doe concluded first that the failure to submit drug amounts
272The fact that the defendant raised his objections at the pre-sentence hearing rather than at
trial does not matter. Under the pre-Apprendi regime, the only time that drug amounts would have
been discussed was at sentencing.
273See generally 297 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2002).
2741d. at 79.
275ld. at 90.
2761d.
277That statute reads: (a) Unlawful acts. Any person who-(1) ... knowingly or
intentionally imports or exports a controlled substance... shall be punished as provided in
subsection (b). Title 21 U.S.C. § 960(a) (2000).
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to a jury was an error.278 First, the court held that the defendant's allocution
during his plea hearing did not establish the drug amounts so as to render
Apprendi error harmless:
Doe did not ... admit to or otherwise specifically address
drug quantities in his plea allocution. Despite his
acknowledgment of the quantity-specific punishments
assigned by 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B)(ii) to importation of
5 kilograms or more of cocaine, Doe did not make any
statements on drug quantity related to his own indicted
crime. Without discussion of quantity relating specifically
to Doe, Doe's allocution simply did not "settle[] the issue
of drug quantity".... 279
Next, Doe concluded that the error affected the defendant's substantial
rights.280 The court reasoned that "Apprendi and Thomas have established
Doe's constitutional right to have the drug quantity which would invoke a
sentence under 21 U.S.C. 960 (b)(1)(B)(ii) determined by a jury under the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard., 281 Doe continued:
Doe could, of course, waive that right by entry of a guilty
plea during which he stipulated or allocuted to drug
quantity. However, at the time of the plea in this case,
neither Apprendi nor Thomas had been decided ....
Nothing in the plea allocution or the sentencing in this case
suggests that Doe was aware of and waived his right to
beyond a reasonable doubt proof as to drug quantity.282
Next, the court passed to the discretionary prong of plain error review
and analyzed the weight of the evidence under the overwhelming and
essentially uncontroverted standard. The court held that in the absence of
overwhelming evidence, it would correct the error.283  Acknowledging
Cotton,28 4  the court applied the overwhelming and essentially
uncontroverted standard to find plain error:
278Doe, 297 F.3d at 90.
2791d
2801d. at 91.
2811d
2821d
2131d. at 92.
2 4See id. at 91.
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[W]e do not believe that Congress or the Court intended
these greater punishments [for higher drug amounts] to fall
upon defendants the breadth of whose activities was not
charged in an indictment and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt as Apprendi and Thomas guarantee where the
evidence against the defendants falls below the
"overwhelming" and "essentially uncontroverted" standard
that Cotton applies.285
Finally, Doe weighed the evidence and found that it fell short of the
286Cotton requirements. The court reasoned that because the evidence of
After this Court heard oral argument in this case, the Supreme Court
issued a decision in United States v. Cotton applying plain error review to the
appeal of defendants sentenced under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)'s quantity based
provisions, rather than under § 841(c) for unquantified offenses, despite the
omission of drug quantity from their indictment. In reversing the Fourth
Circuit's conclusion that the failure to charge drug quantity in the indictment
deprived the court of jurisdiction to impose a sentence above the statutory
maximum for offenses involving an indeterminate amount of drugs, the
Court found the evidence of drug quantity that had been presented at trial to
be both "overwhelming" and "essentially uncontroverted." The Court noted
that faced with this evidence (including physical evidence collected from the
residences and rooms occupied by the defendants) the grand jury that
charged the defendants with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
drugs "surely... would have also found that the conspiracy involved at least
50 grams of cocaine base."
Id.
2 5 Id. at 92.
2861d.
In the case before this Court, we cannot find the evidence against Doe
sufficient to meet Cotton's deservedly high standard. The evidence of drug
quantity that appears from the record on appeal is summarized in the
government's letter seeking to amend the [presentence report]. The evidence
derives from Doe's testimony at the Camancho trial, the testimony of other
Camancho trial witnesses, and Doe's statements to government agents. Even
ignoring the complications arising from the fact that the testimony in
question was in a proceeding at which Doe was a witness for the government
against a co-conspirator rather than a defendant addressing the evidence on
his own behalf.., we note that the testimony from the Camancho trial
indicated drug quantities related to the importation of drugs between 1993
and "late 1995" or "early 1996." Doe's indictment, however, covered only
an approximate six-day period in July, 1996 ....
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drug amounts was obtained from a separate trial, and because the drugs
were allegedly imported over a period of several years (while Doe was only
indicted for a period of six days), "we would stretch Cotton too far to find
'overwhelming' as evidence of quantity involved in drug deals conducted
during one week in July, 1996, reports of amounts imported over a much
more extensive three-year period ending approximately six months before
the time in question. ' 87
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit, in United States v. Bartholomew, found
plain error in the sentencing of a defendant for sixty-five months on a
marijuana charge, where the court decided that the evidence of drug
amounts was not overwhelming or uncontroverted.288 The court noted:
Evidence concerning the amount of marijuana that
Bartholomew conspired to distribute was neither
overwhelming nor essentially uncontroverted. For
example, the government's witness could not state with
certainty whether the four additional tubs in Harris's
residence had contained marijuana. One law enforcement
officer conceded that... he had inspected only one closely.
Although evidence of the tubs supports a determination of
drug quantity by a preponderance of the evidence (as was
applied by the district court in determining Harris's
sentence), it would not necessarily amount to proof of drug
quantity beyond a reasonable doubt.
289
Bartholomew, therefore, removed certain evidence from the weight of
evidence against the defendant because that evidence could only meet a
preponderance of the evidence standard and not a reasonable doubt
standard. Furthermore, Bartholomew distinguished between the vague drug
amounts alleged against the overall conspiracy and the indisputable
amounts properly assessed against the particular defendant: "As the
government concedes, the jury could have convicted Bartholomew based
solely on the single UPS package delivered on December 23, 1998 .... But
if the jury had found only that amount to have been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, Bartholomew's sentence could not have exceeded 60
287id
288310 F.3d 912, 927 (6th Cir. 2002).
289 d. at 926 (emphasis added).
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months' imprisonment., 290 By considering the weight of drugs that was
truly unassailable as applied to that defendant, Bartholomew correctly
applied Cotton's intuition that an error will affect the public reputation of
the courts if the nature of the evidence against the defendant as to drug
amounts is less than absolutely conclusive.
Yet Bartholomew does not go far enough. Bartholomew equates the
overwhelming and uncontroverted standard with reasonable doubt,
subtracting out all evidence that would only be provable by a
preponderance of the evidence. But by its very terms, the overwhelming
and uncontroverted standard is more than just reasonable doubt. Logically,
there must be a set of cases in which the jury would have convicted (i.e., the
evidence as to drug amounts would have been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt), but a court must still remand, not being absolutely sure that such is
the case.
In sum, while Apprendi is applied to a growing number of sentencing-
factor statutes, and in increasingly important cases (such as the death
penalty under Ring), the actual protection that it provides defendants is
rapidly waning. This decreasing protection is the result of courts using
insufficient care in applying Cotton. Cotton does not permit courts to
affirm drug sentences simply because the prosecution included unverified
heavy weights of drugs in the presentence report or alleged vague and vast
amounts of drugs at the sentencing hearing. That evidence was never
before the jury, played no part in its deliberations, and there is no control on
its quality, source, or even its truth. That some subset of that evidence
convinced a judge by a preponderance of the evidence is at least some
indication of quality, but even that evidence is not good enough. Rather,
the accumulation of unassailable and properly attributable evidence must
rise beyond the level of a preponderance of the evidence, or even
reasonable doubt. To affirm a drug sentence without a jury determination
of an essential element of the crime requires evidence so overwhelming that
no rational jury could have chosen but to convict on the omitted element.
Courts should be aware of the pitfalls inherent in applying the Cotton rule
and should take special care to reserve application of the rule to those cases
in which the evidence establishing an element of the crime is directly
applicable to the defendant seeking relief and was truly uncontroverted at
either the trial or at sentencing.
9°Id. at 926-27.
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VII. EVADING COTTON: APPRENDI CHALLENGES BROUGHT UNDER
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
Courts afford Apprendi violations substantive review only on direct
appeal.291  Even on direct appeal, Apprendi appeals face Cotton's
overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted test. Defendants seeking
habeas review and defendants who did not raise an Apprendi objection at
trial are seeking new ways to cast their claims for relief. The most common
of these alternative forms has been to cast a routine Apprendi claim as a
claim for violation of the Fifth Amendment-constructive amendment-of
the indictment.
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution requires, inter
alia, that "no person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.
2 92
In Stirone v. United States, the Supreme Court established the principle that
"after an indictment has been returned its charges may not be broadened
through amendment except by the grand jury itself."293 Subsequent courts
extended the holding of Stirone to cover constructive amendments of an
indictment, where, although the prosecution did not formally amend the
indictment, a different crime was charged to the jury than was originally
included in the indictment.294 The Supreme Court has never added
constructive amendments of the indictment to its list of per se reversible
errors. 29 5  However, prior to Cotton, constructive amendments of the
indictment were considered structural error by several circuits.296
A person who has an Apprendi claim may also, if convicted in a federal
court, assert a plausible Fifth Amendment claim. Pre-Apprendi drug
indictments usually did not contain drug quantities and were simply charges
under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (possession) or section 846 (drug conspiracy).
However, at sentencing, the defendant would be sentenced under one of the
29 1Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1084 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, sub. noma.
Schriro v. Summerlin, No. 03-526, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 8574, at *1 (Dec. 1, 2003).
292U.S. CONST. amend. V.
293361 U.S. 212, 215-16 (1960).
294See, e.g., United States v. Barrow, 118 F.3d 482, 489 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Ford, 872 F.2d 1231, 1235-37 (6th Cir. 1989). A constructive amendment is "a variance that is
accorded the per se prejudicial treatment of an amendment," because, like an actual amendment, it
infringes upon the Fifth Amendment's grand jury guarantee. Id.
29'See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999).
296See United States v. Syme, 276 F.3d 131, 148 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Wade, 266
F.3d 574, 583 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Olson, 925 F.2d 1170, 1175 (9th Cir. 1991).
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section 841(b)(1) sentencing statutes, depending on the amount of drugs
proven by a preponderance of the evidence before the judge. Apprendi, the
argument goes, held that those sentencing factors were essential elements of
the crime. Insofar as a crime is defined by its elements, Apprendi claimants
may argue that they were convicted of a different crime than that charged to
the grand jury, which did not consider evidence of drug amounts.297
In the current jurisprudential climate, a Fifth Amendment constructive
amendment challenge may very well succeed where a straightforward
Apprendi argument would not. First, some circuits treat constructive
amendment of an indictment as per se reversible structural error, thus
bypassing harmless error review.298 Although the logic of Neder and
Cotton would seem to apply to constructive amendments of an indictment
as well as the failure to present a jury with an element, several circuits have
reaffirmed their adherence to per se treatment of constructive amendment of
the indictment claims, even when presented on Apprendi facts.299 Second,
Apprendi has generally been held not to apply to cases on collateral review
under the Supreme Court's reasoning in Teague v. Lane.3 °° It is not,
however, settled that Fifth Amendment claims are Teague-barred, and
courts have indeed granted relief on first habeas petitions. °1
297See United States v. Holt, 46 Fed. Appx. 306, 310-11 (6th Cir. 2002). Holt stated:
While we recognize that there is a serious question as to whether convictions
under the various federal drug sentencing statutes are, after Apprendi,
separate crimes such that a conviction under the [21 U.S.C.] § 841(b)(1)(C)
catch-all sentencing provision would constitute a constructive amendment of
an indictment under any of the other sections, we do not find it necessary to
resolve that question here.
Id. at 310. Holt ultimately rejected the defendant's constructive amendment argument because the
jury indicated on the verdict form that the defendant was guilty of the requisite drug amounts.
Thus, the actual conviction matched the indictment, and the court could not notice the forfeited
error. Id.
298Compare United States v. Syme, 276 F.3d 131, 148 (3d Cir. 2002) (constructive
amendment of an indictment per se reversible under harmless error review), and United States v.
Wade, 266 F.3d 574, 583 (6th Cir. 2001), with United States v. Prentiss, 256 F.3d 971, 984-85
(10th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (constructive amendment of an indictment is trial error subject to
harmless error analysis).
299See Syme, 276 F.3d at 148-49.
300Hartman v. Lee, 283 F.3d 190, 194-95 (4th Cir. 2002) (asserting Sixth Amendment due
process claims for state constructive amendment argument instead of relying on Apprendi proper).
30 The Tyler analysis, above, would indicate that a second or successive petition based on a
constructive amendment claim would not constitute a new rule of law made retroactive on
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Courts should close the Fifth Amendment loophole for three reasons.
First, constructive amendments are primarily concerned with notice to the
defendant. To the extent that an indictment is broadened, a defendant is
required to defend against charges of which he had no notice. However, to
the extent that an indictment is narrowed, there is no notice problem.
Second, Cotton squarely applied plain error review to the failure of a grand
jury to consider each element of the indictment. As a fixed point, therefore,
when a grand jury surely would have indicted a defendant based on
overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted evidence, the sentence may
be affirmed under plain error analysis.3 °2 Finally, to the extent that Cotton
does leave the possibility of treating constructive amendment claims as
structural error for purposes of harmless error analysis open, Neder closes
the loophole, both under its holding and under its logic.
A. The Mechanics of Constructive Amendments
"A constructive amendment occurs where a defendant is deprived of his
'substantial right to be tried only on charges presented in an indictment
returned by a grand jury.',, 30 3 The Fifth Amendment offers an opportunity
to challenge both conviction and sentence if the defendant can show that the
facts proven at trial deviate sufficiently from the crime for which he was
indicted. Several circuits treat an amendment to the indictment as a "per se
violation of the fifth amendment's grand jury clause. ' 3°  This gives a
constructive amendment claim a chance of success when a regular Apprendi
claim would be denied, either because Apprendi is Teague-barred from
being first asserted on collateral review, or because the chances of
prevailing on a Fifth Amendment claim may simply be better than a
standard Apprendi argument.
Not every deviation from the indictment invalidates the trial. A slight
change in the charge will not be considered sufficient grounds to overturn
collateral review, if only because the Supreme Court case establishing the constructive
amendment line of analysis, Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215-16 (1960), is not a new
law with respect to AEDPA. However, whether such a claim would be barred by Teague on a
first habeas petition remains an open question. See, e.g., Lucas v. O'Dea, 179 F.3d 412, 416-18
(6th Cir. 1999) (affirming grant of first petition for a writ of habeas corpus on constructive
amendment grounds).
302United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 634 (2002).
313Syme, 276 F.3d at 148 (citing United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 140 (1985)).
304Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); accord United States v. Wade, 266 F.3d 574, 583
(6th Cir. 2001).
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the conviction. A variance between the indictment and the crime proven at
trial will only prove fatal if the difference between the indictment and the
crime charged to the jury is so severe that the defendant would be convicted
for a different crime than that for which he was indicted.3 °5
Indeed, the fact that constructive amendment claims are primarily
concerned with notice provides courts with a first, and simple, objection to
permitting defendants to raise constructive amendment claims on what are
essentially Apprendi facts. Constructive amendment claims are generally
impermissible broadening claims-yet constructive amendment claims
based on Apprendi facts are for impermissible narrowing of the
306indictment. Variances from the indictment are not fatal under the Fifth
Amendment if the variance narrows, rather than expands, the indictment.30 7
Certainly the Court's reasoning in Cotton bears out this premise. The
Fourth Circuit had reversed the sentences in Cotton "on the question of
whether respondents had notice that they would face an increased sentence"
as the result of the sentencing judge's findings of drug amounts.308 Despite
this, the Court applied plain error review indicating that either the Court
found that there was no notice problem created by the narrowing of the
indictment or, as argued below, that constructive amendment claims are not
per se reversible, and are properly subject to harmless and plain error
review.
B. Cotton and the Failure to Present an Element of the Crime to a
Grand Jury
Courts must also consider the impact of Cotton on the constructive
amendment jurisprudence of their respective circuits. Cotton expressly
contemplated the Fifth Amendment ramifications of the Apprendi rule, both
305See, e.g., United States v. Matthews, 47 Fed. Appx. 456, 461 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Generally, a
variance warrants reversal only if it constitutes a constructive amendment of the indictment-that
is, if the defendant was effectively convicted of a crime that was not charged in the indictment.").
306This is because an indictment without drug amount specification would put the defendant
prior to Apprendi on notice that he could be indicted for any one of the drug amount defenses
under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(l)(A), (B), or (C). By proving a specific drug amount, the prosecution
narrowed the broad initial indictment down to one of the specific sentencing statutes.
307See, e.g., United States v. Weinstock, 153 F.3d 272, 279 (6th Cir. 1998) ("A distillation of
the above cases establishes the principle that if the evidence offered at trial proves a narrower
scheme than the one alleged in the indictment, then the variance is not fatal.").
30 8Transcript of Oral Argument at *2-*3, United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002) (No.
01-687), available at 2002 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 34.
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at oral argument and in the written opinion. At oral argument, Chief Justice
Rehnquist asked Mr. Dreeben, counsel for the United States, to discuss the
impact of the government's position on Stirone.30 9 Mr. Dreeben argued that
a government-favorable decision would not require Stirone to be overruled
for two reasons. First, he pointed out that Stirone was a harmless error case
because in that case the defendant had raised an objection below.310
Second, he noted that Stirone presented a true notice problem because the
defendant in Stirone was required to defend against a completely different
charge at trial than was included in the indictment.3"1
In the written opinion, the Court noted that the respondent defendants
had raised the question of whether, under Stirone, a constructive
amendment of the indictment constituted per se reversible structural
error. 31 2 However, the Court reserved that question, along with the question
of whether the defendant's substantial rights were violated.31 3 By contrast,
the central holding of Cotton expressly stated that the failure to raise a
constructive amendment claim could be waived by failing to object at the
trial level.314 Cotton held that failure to submit the element of drug amounts
3 9Id. at *11.3 1Old
3
'Id. at *12.312United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 632 (2002).
3131d. at 632-33.
314For a good analysis of the intersection between the holding of Cotton and Fifth
Amendment jurisprudence, see United States v. Carr, 303 F.3d 539, 543-44 (4th Cir. 2001).
At oral argument [defendant's] lawyer emphasized the importance of the
Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury to support Carr's claim that the
indictment defect seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings. Specifically, the lawyer argued that it is
essential to the basic fairness and integrity of the criminal process that the
indictment set forth every ingredient of the crime charged. However, in
Cotton the Supreme Court, citing Johnson, rejected essentially the same
argument. In Johnson the Court held that the judge's failure in a perjury trial
to instruct the jury on the essential element of materiality did not seriously
affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
This was because the "evidence of materiality.., was 'overwhelming' and
,essentially uncontroverted."' Thus, in Johnson the defendant's conviction
was upheld because even though the petit jury was not charged on one of the
essential elements of perjury, the uncharged element (materiality) was
nevertheless established by evidence that was one-sided and
overwhelming ....
Here, as in Cotton and Johnson, there is no question that the evidence
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to the grand jury was not plain error when the evidence of drug amounts
was so overwhelming and uncontroverted that the grand jury would surely
have indicted for the requisite drug amounts. Therefore, Cotton must be
read for the proposition that a defendant who fails to object to a
constructive amendment of the indictment at trial forfeits that objection and
may only seek remand under plain error analysis.
315
C. Circuit Precedent on Constructive Amendments in the Wake of
Cotton
Despite Cotton's guidance, there is still considerable confusion over
how to deal with constructive amendment claims brought on Apprendi
facts. Courts have taken several approaches: (1) per se reversal and
remand of constructive amendments under both plain error and harmless
error review;3 16 (2) per se treatment of constructive amendment claims of
harmless error, but unvarnished review of unobjected-to errors for plain
error;31 7 (3) per se treatment of constructive amendments under harmless
error, and a presumption of prejudice for the substantial rights portion of the
analysis under plain error review; 318 and (4) complete rejection of per se
treatment, and the application of full substantial rights analysis to
constructive amendments under both harmless and plain error review.319
unequivocally and overwhelmingly supported the missing element, namely,
that the apartment building was damaged or destroyed by fire.
Id. (citations omitted); accord United States v. Carrington, 301 F.3d 204, 213 (4th Cir. 2002)
(holding that when an indictment gave sufficient notice of the drug amounts in contention, the
failure to include a precise charge as to drug amounts did not render the indictment fatally
defective under Cotton).
315See, e.g., United States v. Matthews, 47 Fed. Appx. 456, 462 (9th Cir. 2002).
At one point in our circuit, before Cotton and Olano, it was established that a
constructive amendment [of the indictment] always warranted reversal.
But... Cotton conclusively holds that a defendant may forfeit his claim of
error regarding a defective indictment if he fails to object.... Under such
circumstances, we review for plain error.
Id. (citations omitted).
316United States v. Olson, 925 F.2d 1170, 1175 (9th Cir. 1991). But see Matthews, 47 Fed.
Appx. at 462 (implying that Olson is no longer good law after Cotton).
317See generally United States v. Wade, 266 F.3d 574 (6th Cir. 2001).
318United States v. Syme, 276 F.3d 131, 136 (3d Cir. 2002).
319United States v. Trennell, 290 F.3d 881, 887 (7th Cir. 2002).
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In United States v. Syme, for example, the defendant owner and operator
of a private ambulance service was convicted of fraud because he
misrepresented the "home state" of his business, and thereby was
overcompensated for services.320 The prosecution alleged that Syme made
transports which were not "medically necessary" in order to receive
reimbursements that were improper under the relevant health plans.321 On
appeal, Syme argued that the prosecution had improperly added a legally
impermissible theory to the case, since "home state" had not been
sufficiently defined to be a basis for a fraud conviction. The court rejected
this claim of legal impermissibility but did decide to reverse and remand
one count of the conviction because the district court constructively
amended the indictment "by instructing the jury on a fraud theory that was
not alleged in the count.
322
Syme held that the third element of the plain error test, prejudice to
substantial rights, is automatically satisfied in constructive amendment
cases: "[W]e hold that constructive amendments, which are per se
reversible under harmless error review, are presumptively prejudicial under
plain error review.,, 323  Syme continued: "[I]t is uncertain
whether.., application of the per se rule has survived Olano, which
recognized broader discretion for appellate courts exercising plain error
review." 324  The court noted the division among the circuits on this
important question and turned to the text of Olano for instruction.325 The
court noted: "Olano stated that in order for an error to 'affect substantial
rights' under the plain error test, the defendant usually must show that the
error was 'prejudicial,' that is that it 'affected the outcome of the district
court proceedings.' ' 326  Following Olano, Syme held that a constructive
amendment falls into that category of errors in which the defendant no
longer bears the burden of establishing prejudice to his substantial rights.327
32°Syme, 276 F.3d at 137-38.
311d. at 138.
3221d. at 136.
3231d.
3241d. at 152.
325
"Several courts of appeals have considered the question whether a constructive amendment
is per se reversible under the plain error standard, but the circuits are divided and the resulting law
is checkered .. " Id.
3261d. at 153 (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993)).
327 See id. at 154
Like a denial of the right of allocution, a constructive amendment also
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Indeed, Cotton could be read to leave open this presumed prejudice
approach. The Court connected the questions: whether the defendant had
suffered a structural constructive amendment of the indictment, and whether
the substantial rights of the defendants had been affected, and avoided both
at once, by concentrating its analysis on the judicial reputation element of
plain error review. Cotton, therefore, left courts to speculate whether such
an error would constitute a violation of the defendant's substantial rights
under harmless error analysis. Thus, the best argument against completely
closing the Fifth Amendment loophole is that Cotton considered the
question of structural error to go only to the question of prejudice and
substantial rights and not to impact the fourth (judicial reputation) element
of plain error review.
D. Courts Should Close the Fifth Amendment Loophole
Courts should nevertheless reject this reasoning as incomplete and close
the Fifth Amendment loophole entirely. First, Cotton held that the failure
of a grand jury to include every element of a crime in an indictment was
subject to plain error review. Plain error analysis must therefore apply to
constructive amendments under Cotton when the court is considering the
fourth element (judicial reputation and integrity) of a plain error analysis.328
For the majority of Apprendi appeals, which are for plain error, courts
should apply Cotton's overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted test to
determine whether an impermissible broadening of the indictment would
damage the integrity and reputation of judicial proceedings. If there is
overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted evidence on point, then the
grand jury's failure to include that element in the indictment may be
affirmed under Cotton.
violates a basic right of criminal defendants, the grand jury guarantee of the
Fifth Amendment. We follow the holding of Adams that some serious errors
should be presumed prejudicial in the plain error context even if they do not
constitute structural errors and find that constructive amendments fall into
that category. Similar to the plight of a defendant who is denied the right of
allocution, it is very difficult for a defendant to prove prejudice resulting
from most constructive amendments to an indictment.
Id.
328See, e.g., United States v. Matthews, 47 Fed. Appx. 456, 462 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Cotton
conclusively holds that a defendant may forfeit his claim of error regarding a defective indictment
if he fails to object.... Under such circumstances, we review for plain error.").
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Harmless error is a much more difficult question, but the answer should
be the same. As discussed above, Cotton discussed Stirone as part of the
substantial rights question for harmless error review and reserved
consideration of Stirone at the same time that it decided not to answer
whether the error affected defendants' substantial rights. However, to be
fully consistent with Supreme Court precedent, courts should apply the
overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted test to constructive
amendments claims even when the appeal is based on harmless error.
First, Neder covers any loophole left by Cotton. Neder applied the
overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted test to substantial rights
analysis under the harmless error standard. Cotton was based on the
premise that where there is an overwhelming amount of evidence
establishing an element of the crime, the courts will not be thrown into
disrepute by affirming the sentence. Neder, however, used the
overwhelming and uncontroverted standard to explain that, in the context of
harmless error review, the defendant's substantial rights were not affected
when there was unassailable evidence establishing the element of the crime.
Neder reasoned that most constitutional errors were harmless, and that only
those errors that rendered a trial fundamentally unfair would be reversed as
structural. Neder then noted:
The error at issue here-a jury instruction that omits an
element of the offense--differs markedly from the
constitutional violations that we have found to defy
harmless-error review ....
Unlike such defects as the complete deprivation of
counsel or trial before a biased judge, an instruction that
omits an element of the offense does not necessarily render
a criminal trial fundamentally unfair .... 329
Neder's logic-that the failure to submit a single element of a crime to a
jury does not render the trial fundamentally unfair-applies equally to the
constructive amendment context, where the variance between what is
charged in the indictment and what instructions are given to the jury at trial
creates the violation.
Second, and more practically, the Supreme Court has never recognized
constructive amendments as structural error. Stirone was not included in
329Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1999).
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the Neder list of established structural errors, which the Court has further
declined to expand.330 The Supreme Court was presented, in Cotton, with
the opportunity to add constructive amendments of the indictment to the list
of formally recognized structural errors. 331 The Court declined to do so.
Thus, in both the harmless error and plain error settings, there is no reason
to treat the failure to present an element of a crime to a grand jury any
differently than a failure to present an element of a crime to a petit jury.
VIII.CONCLUSION
While the theoretical protections of the right to a jury trial continue to
expand as Apprendi is applied in new legal contexts, the practical
protections of that same right are drastically contracting. Based on United
States v. Cotton, too many courts now disregard Apprendi error, based on
overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted evidence, when the evidence
is neither overwhelming nor uncontroverted as a matter of common sense.
Properly read, the Cotton rule allows a court to disregard a clear-cut
violation of the defendant's right to a jury trial under very special
circumstances-when the evidence of the essential element is unassailable.
As applied, however, the Cotton standard has worked a complete and
across-the-board reversal in the treatment of these cases. Prior to Cotton,
courts routinely reversed clear Apprendi errors; after Cotton, Apprendi
appeals were and are routinely denied by courts, holding that the evidence
of drug amounts was sufficiently overwhelming and uncontroverted to omit
the need for a jury to find that element beyond a reasonable doubt.
This has caused defendants to abandon their straightforward Apprendi
claims for the murkier Fifth Amendment constructive amendment of the
indictment claims. Courts should close the Fifth Amendment loophole.
Leaving the loophole open only promotes confusion over what is a
structural error and permits a meaningless distinction to determine whether
the defendant's sentence is per se reversed or routinely affirmed.
Furthermore, Cotton applied plain error review to a claim that every
element of the crime was not included in the indictment. At a bare
minimum, therefore, courts should apply plain error review, under Cotton,
to constructive amendment claims.
As they close a window, however, the courts should open the door.
Courts of appeals should think deeply about the Cotton standard and how to
33
°See id. at 8.
331See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 632 (2002).
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apply it. First, courts must define more carefully what weight of evidence
is overwhelming and what type of objections render a drug amount
controverted. Courts should not continue to affirm convictions where the
drug amounts were only admitted at trial under the evidentiary standard of
relevance (only tending to establish a point in contention), only proven
before a judge to a preponderance of the evidence, or even proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. The evidence must meet a higher standard to satisfy
Cotton: the court must not only be satisfied that the jury in the case would
have convicted, but that no rational jury could do otherwise on that weight
of the evidence.
Also, courts should remand convictions for re-sentencing where the
defendant did in fact contest drug amounts at the sentencing hearing. While
cases like Lopez are probably correct that an objection to the amount of
drugs should not count as raising an Apprendi objection for the purposes of
preserving error for harmless error review, that same objection, if made in
good faith, should act as controversy under the Cotton rule, sufficient to
permit the court to remand under the plain error standard.332 Even if the
evidence is strong (short of overwhelming) as to the drug amount, a
defendant's vigorous protests below should convince courts that the failure
to submit the element of the crime to the jury would constitute plain error.
This Article began with the assertion that the protection of the innocent
was the animating force of criminal law, but innocence is a strange beast.
In the cases discussed above, the defendants are never completely innocent;
the entire thrust of the question on appeal is to establish whether the
defendant is responsible for a greater or a lesser crime. The question is
whether the defendant has been proven guilty enough to be subjected to a
higher range of punishment, and how willing we are, as a society, to impose
punishment despite the fact that a jury has not made that finding beyond a
reasonable doubt.
332Compare United States v. Strayhom, 250 F.3d 462, 467 (6th Cir. 2001) (drug quantity
objection counts as Apprendi objection below), with United States v. Lopez, 309 F.3d 966, 969
(6th Cir. 2002) (drug quantity objection does not raise Apprendi objection, and review is for plain
error).
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